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 ABSTRACT
Livestock pricing policies in many developing countries are often instituted without a good appreciation of
the consequences of such policies for allocative efficiency, output, trade and consumption. This paper
evaluates, in a comparative cross-country context, the objectives and instruments of livestock pricing policy
in five sub-Saharan African countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe during the period
1970-86. It examines the extent towhich pricing policy objectives have been attained and estimates the effects
of price interventions on output, consumption, trade and government revenues in order to draw out lessons
for the future.
The empirical results indicate that in comparison with real border prices, a certain degree of success
was achieved in stabilising real domestic producer prices in the study countries. However, consumers still
appear to gain as much as producers in three of the study countries, with negative consequences for foreign
exchange earnings and government revenues. The analysis reveals the importance of domestic inflation and
exchange rates as key variables for livestock pricing policies and highlights the need to address the macro-
economic imbalances that cause exchange-rate distortions and high domestic inflation at the same time that
direct price distortions are being tackled.
KEYWORDS
/Côted'Ivoire//Mali//Nigeria//Sudan//Zimbabwe//livestock//marketing//pricepolicy/-/consumption//income/
/resource allocation//social welfare// social costs//foreign exchange/.
RESUME
// arrive souvent que lespolitiques desprix des pays en développement soient instituées sans tenir compte
de leurs conséquences sur l'efficacité de la distribution des ressources, ainsi que sur laproduction, le commerce
et la consommation des produits d'origine animale. La présente étude présente une évaluationpaysparpays,
des objectifs et des instruments despolitiques desprix desproduits d 'origine animale dans cinqpays de l'Afrique
subsaharienne, à savoir la Côte d'Ivoire, le Mali, le Nigéria, le Soudan et le Zimbabwe entre 1970 et 1986. Elle
mesure le degré de réussite des politiques des prix par rapport à leurs objectifs et détermine les effets des
interventions sur les prix sur la production, la consommation, et le commerce des produits d 'origine animale,
de même que sur les recettes publiques de l'Etat en vue d 'en tirer les enseignements qui s 'imposent.
Ilressortdes résultats empiriques de l'étude queparrapport auxprixfrontière réels, les pays concernés ont
dans une certaine mesure réussi à stabiliser leurs prix intérieurs réels au producteur. Ces résultats révèlent
également depuis le début des années 80, un renoncementprogressifde cespays à leurpolitique de taxation des
producteurs. Toutefois, dans trois des pays considérés, les consommateurs semblent profiter autant que les
producteurs des politiques officielles desprix, avec des conséquences négatives sur les recettes en devises et les
recettes fiscales de l'Etat. L'analyse entreprise dans l'étude révèle l'importance de l'inflation intérieure et des
taux de change en tant que variables clés des politiques des prix des produits d'origine animale et met l'accent
sur la nécessitépour l'Etat de corriger les déséquilibres macro-économiques responsables des distorsions des
taux de change et de l'exacerbation de l'inflation intérieure au moment même où il entreprend de corriger les
distorsions directes des prix.
MOTS CLES
/Côte d 'Ivoirel/Malil/Nigéria//Soudan//Zimbabwel/bétaill/commercialisation//politiques des prix//consom
mation//revenu//répartition des ressources//bien-être social//coûts sociaux/ldevises/.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Among the ways in which governments intervene in
the livestock subsector, the most prevalent, and
arguably the most important, is interference with
prices. Price intervention policies are often
implemented with the aim of achieving certain
broad objectives which, in developing countries,
include output expansion, government revenue
generation, improvement of income distribution,
stabilisation and inflation control. In pursuing these
objectives, governments possess a wide variety of
policy instruments which can be manipulated
directly with the intention of achieving the desired
objectives. For example, they can establish price
controls or price supports to benefit consumers and
producers, respectively, or they can impose import
duties and export taxes to raise government
revenue. In addition to direct measures, indirect
forms of government intervention including
exchange rate adjustments can also influence the
production, consumption and trade of livestock
products.
In reality, sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries have pursued a wide variety of pricing
policies, differing in the choice of instruments as well
as in their objectives. The effects of these policies
on production incentives have also been varied. The
multiplicity of objectives and their instruments
suggests that in some cases conflicts will arise
between the desired objectives and the policies
pursued to achieve them. The likelihood of such
conflicts is heightened when, as often happens, the
different ministries of these countries are interested
in different objectives. The ministry of agriculture,
for instance, may advocate higher farm prices to
encourage output expansion while the finance
ministry may be interested in interventions that raise
revenues. In this situation, one of the contributions
of price policy research will be to quantify the effects
of different policy options in order to permit an
informed discussion which can lead to better
decision making and an improved incentive system.
The broad objective of this study is to review,
analyse and present evidence concerning the effects
of livestock pricing policies on production incentives
in a sample ofSSA countries. The specific objectives
are to:
• provide a comparative picture of objectives
and policy instruments used by selected SSA
countries with respect to the livestock
sub-sector
• estimate the effects of direct and indirect price
interventions on incentives, livestock output,
consumption, trade and government revenue.
In what follows, the experiences of six SSA
countries are profiled. These countries, namely
C6te d'lvoire, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and
Zimbabwe, were selected on the basis of their
livestock population, production, trade and
consumption. Data were collected through
interviews with policy makers and livestock
marketing officials and from a wide range ofprimary
and secondary published documents.
To introduce the subsequent discussion,
Chapter 2 examines the growth and performance of
the livestock subsector in the study countries. It
demonstrates the diversity of situations and
experiences with respect to production,
consumption, export and import of livestock
products.
Chapter 3 considers the multiple objectives of
price policies in the selected countries and analyses
1. For this study, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are taken to include only those 39 countries listed in ILCA 's
strategy and long-term plan document (see ILCA, 1987a).
 the principal instruments employed to influence Chapter 4 assesses the impact of government
producer and consumer prices. The discussion intervention on price incentives. The final chapter
highlights similarities and the diversity in objectives discusses the effect of intervention on the welfare of
and policies dealing with the livestock subsector and producers and consumers and on foreign trade and
also examines the compatibility of policy goals with government revenue. It concludes by highlighting
their instruments. the main findings of the study.
2. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TRADE
This chapter examines the main features of the
livestock subsector in the selected countries by
assessing trends in production, trade and
consumption of certain livestock products. The
discussion is confined to cattle, sheep and goats (the
three ruminant species presently included in ILCA's
research agenda) and to the food products derived
from them (i.e. meat and milk). The policy
implications of the observed trends are briefly
discussed to set the context for the discussion of
pricing policy that follows.
THE PRODUCTION STRUCTURE
Although there are many similarities in the livestock
production systems of SSA, there are also important
variations. Such variations reflect differences in
climate, availability of grazing land and incidence of
diseases such as trypanosomiasis. In the countries
selected for this study, pastoral systems account for
the bulk of ruminant livestock production, except in
Zimbabwe where cattle ranching and mixed
crop-livestock production systems are very
important.
Aggregate meat production and related data
for the selected countries are shown in Table 1. The
selected countries together account for almost half
the total meat production (by weight) in SSA Per
capita meat production varies, from about 8.5 kg per
person in Nigeria to 25.3 kg per person in Sudan,
reflecting substantial differences in population and
pastoral resources among the countries considered.
Table 1. Meatproduction, humanpopulation andper capita gross nationalproduct in the selected countries, 1985.
Country
Total meat
production
('000 t)
Human population
mid-1985
(millions)
Per capita meat
production
(kg)
Per capita
GNP
(US$)
C6te d'lvoire
Ethiopia
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Total, selected
countries
SSA
127
556
134
846
553
110
2326
4875
10.1 12.6 660
42.3 13.1 110
7.5 17.9 150
99.7 8.5 800
21.9 25.3 300
8.4 13.1 680
189.9 12.3
418.0 11.7 400
1. Relates to meat from different livestock species slaughtered within national boundaries, regardless of their origin
Sources: FAO (1986a) for total meat production data; World Bank (1987) for human population and GNP figures.
2. The corresponding figure for milk is also about 50% (see Table 2).
Beef accounts for 41% (by weight) of total
meat production in the selected countries. It is
followed in importance by goat meat (12%) and
mutton (11%). Domestic milk production is also
important, but Sudan alone accounts for over 50%
of total milk production in these countries (Table 2).
When products are weighted by equivalent border
production of goat meat, lamb and mutton though
this declined by 1983-85. For the selected periods,
total meat production per capita increased modestly
in two countries, remained about constant in one
and declined in three.
Per capita milk production also varied from
country to country over the 12-year period 1971-73
Table 2. Production oflivestockproducts in the selected countries, 1983-85.
Production ('000 1)
Country
Beef and veal
Mutton and
lamb
Goat meat Cow milk2
C6te d'lvoire 42 6 6 15
Ethiopia 215 86 65 600
Mali 49 20 21 106
Nigeria 239 44 134 348
Sudan 309 92 39 1735
Zimbabwe 72 1 5 196
Total, selected countries 926 249 270 3000
Sub-Saharan Africa 2037 379 484 6125
1. Annual 1983-85 average.
2. Total production of whole fresh cow milk.
Source: FAO (1986a) and FAO (1987) for 1983 figures.
prices, the value of beef is the highest, followed by
milk, mutton and goat meat, in that order.
Aggregate meat shares, however, conceal
important country variations in production. The
share of beef in total meat output varies among
countries from 29 to 64%. For goat meat the share
is 4 to 16% and for mutton and lamb, 1 to 18%. The
share of beef is high and about equal in Sudan and
Zimbabwe despite enormous differences in
production systems. The goat meat share is high in
Nigeria and Mali but very low in Zimbabwe and
Cote d'lvoire.
Trends in meat and milk production
Per capita meat production levels are shown in
Table 3. In spite of the limitations of the production
data from which these estimates are derived, the
ratios do provide an indication of relative change
over time. Per capita beef production declined over
the period 1971-73 to 1983-85 in all the selected
countries, except Sudan. During the 1971-73 to
1977-79 period, only two countries, Mali and
Sudan, showed a slight increase in per capita
to 1983-85 (Table 4). In one country (Sudan), there
was a substantial increase in production, while per
capita milk production either declined or remained
constant in the remaining countries. The underlying
causes of these different production performances
are varied, but may include natural disasters (e.g.
acute recurring drought) that reduce feed
availability, access to external markets and
government economic policies. The effects of
government economic policies on production
incentives are examined in detail in Chapter 4.
GENERAL AND PER CAPITA
CONSUMPTION STRUCTURE
Table 5 shows the level of meat consumption in the
study countries. Total per capita meat consumption
in 1983-85 varied from about 9 to 25 kg reflecting
differences in meat prices, income, population and
agricultural resources among countries.
Except for Mali in recent years, beef is the
principal meat consumed in the study countries.
Beefaccounts for between 54 and 64% of total meat
consumption in Zimbabwe, between 48 and 59% in
3. Border equivalent prices are world prices adjusted for transport and marketing costs. For a country, border prices
represent opportunity costs at which goods can be exported or imported. See Appendix 1 for a description of how
they are derived for the study countries.
Table 3. Annual average production ofmeat by country, selectedperiods.
Production (kg per capita)
Beef Sheep and goat meat All meat
Countiy 1971-73 1977-79 1983-S5 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-79 1683-85
Cflte d'lvoire 7.6 4.5 4.3 1.8 1.4 1.2 16.4 13.5 12.8
Ethiopia 8.0 6.8 5.1 5.2 4.3 3.6 18.6 16.5 13.2
Mali 7.4 6.4 7.3 4.6 6.7 6.0 17.9 18.8 18.4
Nigeria 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 8.2 8.2 8.5
Sudan 9.5 11.2 14.5 5.1 6.7 6.2 19.3 22.4 24.6
Zimbabwe 18.8 14.9 9.5 1.4 1.0 0.6 25.1 20.7 14.8
SSA 5.8 5.6 4.8 2.2 2.3 2.1 12.3 12.3 11.5
Sources: Meat production data from FAO (1987; 1989); human population data from World Bank Atlas (various years)
and FAO (1989).
Table 4. Annual average production ofcow milk by country, selected periods.
Production (kg per capita)
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85
C6te d'lvoire
Ethiopia
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
SSA
1.4
20.8
18.7
4.5
47.6
24.6
16.4
1.3
18.6
13.8
4.1
58.2
21.3
15.9
lS
14.4
13.8
3.6
81.5
23.6
15.2
Source: Meat production data from FAO (1987; 1989); human population data from World Bank atlas (various years)
and FAO (1989).
1 iTable 5. Annual average apparent consumption ofmeat by country, selectedperiods.
Consumption (kg per capita)
Beef Sheep and goat meat All meat
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85
C6te d'lvoire 7.5 7.0 5.5 1.7 1.6 1.3 15.9 15.9 14.5
Ethiopia 7.1 6.8 5.6 5.1 4.4 4.0 17.4 16.4 14.5
Mali 6.7 6.3 4.5 4.2 6.4 5.6 16.4 18.0 15.4
Nigeria 3.3 3.3 2.5 2.1 2.2 1.9 8.7 9.6 9.1
Sudan 10.3 11.1 14.7 5.7 6.7 6.3 21.3 22.6 25.1
Zimbabwe 11.8 6.9 6.6 1.7 1.2 0.7 18.3 12.7 11.4
SSA 6.7 6.6 5.2 2.6 25 2.2 14.9 15.2 12.2
1. Apparent consumption of meat, expressed in terms ofcarcass weight, is obtained from data on slaughtered production
and trade in beef, sheep and goat meat (FAO, 1985).
2 Figures for 1971-73 and 1977-79 are annual averages based on per capita consumption data from FAO (1985); 1983-85
averages are from ILCA (1987b).
Sources: FAO (1985); ILCA (1987b).
 Sudan, and between 27 and 47% in the remaining
countries.
Although sheep and goat meat are widely
consumed, their relative importance varies among
countries. In 1983-85, the share of sheep and goat
meat in total meat consumption was 36% in Mali
compared with 6% in Zimbabwe. Overall, the meat
products considered here together account for
more than 50% of the total meat consumed in the
study countries.
Per capita milk consumption also differs
greatly among countries, from about 8 kg liquid milk
equivalent (LME) in Nigeria to more than 80 kg in
Sudan in 1983-85 (Table 6). The wide variation in
milk consumption is partly explained by differences
1980s in Sudan, consumption declined in Nigeria
and Cdte d'lvoire over the same period. In all other
countries, per capita consumption of milkwas lower
in 1983-85 than in 1971-73.
The annual growth rates of total domestic
production and consumption of the livestock
products considered here appear in Table 7. While
growth rates such as those cited in Table 7 are only
rough estimates, it would appear that increases in
consumption have exceeded domestic production
increases by a substantial amount, particularly for
milk. The growing gap between domestic
production and consumption is further confirmed
by the net trade data presented in the next section.
Table 6. Annual average apparent consumption ofmilk by country, selected periods.
Milk consumption (kg LME per capita)
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85
C6te d'lvoire
Ethiopia
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
SSA
11.0
21.1
20.7
8.0
48.6
26.2
18.9
16.6
19.4
17.2
11.4
60.2
21.6
20.7
14.6
17.1
17.2
7.8
85.8
25.8
20.2
 
1. Apparent consumption is defined as cow milk production plus net imports of fresh, dried and condensed milk
expressed in liquid milk equivalents (LME). No attempt was made to deduct milk fed to calves from the cow milk
production figures.
Sources: FAO (1987; 1989); FAO tradeyearbook (various issues); ILCA (1987b), and World Bank Atlas (various years)
in dietary habits. As indicated later on in this
chapter, the percentage of total milk consumed that
is imported varies from about 5 to 89%, and imports
have been rising rapidly in recent years.
Trends in meat and milk consumption
Table 5 shows that between 1971-73 and 1983-85
per capita beef consumption fell in five countries
and increased only in one. Per capita sheep and goat
meat consumption which had risen significantly in
Mali and to a lesser extent in Sudan in the 1970s,
rose very little in the early 1980s in these two
countries. In the remaining countries per capita
consumption fell. The share of sheep and goat meat
in total meat consumption increased significantly in
Mali, but fell in all the other countries.
Per capita consumption of milk rose in the
1970s in C6te d'lvoire, Nigeria and Sudan (Table 6).
While the growth was maintained into the early
PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
IN MEAT AND MILK
The diversity of trade activities in meat and milk in
the selected countries is illustrated by the data
presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10 for beef, sheep and
goat meat and milk, respectively. Live animals make
up the bulk of meat exports which are directed
mostly towards neighbouring African countries.
Ethiopia and Sudan export live animals to the
Middle East. Zimbabwe is the only country that
exports beef to the EEC under the Lom6
convention.
With respect to beef, four out of the six
countries were net exporters between 1971-73 and
1983-85 (Table 8). Export volumes, however,
declined in three and increased only in one. The
remaining two countries - Cflte d'lvoire and Nigeria
- have been net importers. Tlie level of imports in
the former has been nearly constant over the past 15
years, but imports rose significantly in the latter.
Table 7. Estimated annual growth rates oftotal domestic production and consumption oflivestock products by country,
1971-85.
Product
Beef
Sheep and goat meat
Cow milk
Production Consumption
Country
C6te d'lvoire 1.09" 2.45
Ethiopia 0.30 0.90
Mali 1.93 -0.35"
Nigeria 2.71 2.71
Sudan 6.05 5.49
Zimbabwe -237
0.30a
C6te d'lvoire 1.98 2.62
Ethiopia 1.23 1.23
Mali 5.44 6.15
Nigeria 3.28 3.14
Sudan 3.61 4.01
Zimbabwe -6.24 -5.40
Cfite d'lvoire 5.46 839
Ethiopia 1.05 2.43
Mali 1.71* 1.93
Nigeria 1.83 4.01
Sudan 7.38 7.70
Zimbabwe 230 2.69
Note: The annual growth rate has been estimated as a log linear trend by ordinary least squares regression,
a. The regression coefficient used to estimate the growth rate was not significant at the 5% level.
Sources: FAO (1987); FAO tradeyearbook (various issues); ILCA (1987b).
Table 8. Average annual trade in beefby country, selectedperiods.
Deports
Beef trade ('000 t)
Imports Net exports or im
1971-73 1977-79
ports (-)
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1983-85
C6te d'lvoire 0.0 0.1 0.1 363 41.8 37.9 -363 -41.7 -37.8
Ethiopia 173 2.4 3.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 17.2 2.4 3.5
Mali 21.9 15.7 453 1.1 0.3 0.6 20.8 15.4 44.9
Nigeria 0.1 0.3 0.0 343 57.9 53.0 -34.4 -57.6 -53.0
Sudan 7.8 2.1 3.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 7.1 1.8 3.0
Zimbabwe 44.6 60.8 21.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 44.6 60.7 21.8
SSA 254.4 212.7 153.0 164.3 196.6 270.4 90.1 16.1 -117.4
1. Trade data for 1971-73 and 1977-79 are from FAO (1985) and include meat and live animals in terms of carcass
weight. To obtain figures for 1983-85, trade data on fresh bovine and canned meat (ILCA, 1987b; FAO, 1989) were
added to the meat equivalent of live cattle traded. The latter was calculated using FAO (1986a) carcass weights as
conversion factors.
Sources: FAO (1985; 1986a; 1989); FAO tradeyearbook (1985); ILCA (1987b).
Table 9 shows that Sudan, Mali and Ethiopia
have been net exporters of sheep and goat meat.
Over the period considered, exports from Mali more
than doubled and rose appreciably in Sudan, while
Cdte d'lvoire and Nigeria were again net importers.
Trade in goat meat, lamb and mutton was
insignificant in Zimbabwe.
Trade in milk consists mostly of dried,
condensed and evaporated milk imports. As
suggested earlier, milk production in the study
Tabic 9. Average annual trade in sheep and goat meat by country, selectedperiods. l
Exports
Sheep and goat meat trade ('000 0
Imports Net exports or imi
1971-73 1977-79
X)rts(-)
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-99 1983-85 1983-85
Cote d'lvoire 0.0 0.0 0.0 4J 5.2 3.8 ^L5 -5.2 -3.8
Ethiopia 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4
Mali 2.1 2.8 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.8 5.2
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.5 3.1 -3.3 -3.5 -3.1
Sudan 3.8 5.4 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.8 5.4 7.0
Zimbabwe 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
SSA 43.2 60.2 37.5 16.0 15.6 17.8 27.2 44.6 19.7
1. Trade data for 1971-73 and 1977-79 are from FAO (1985); 1983-85 figures were obtained by adding up trade data for
fresh sheep meat (ILCA, 1987b) and the meat equivalent of live sheep and goats traded (in terms of carcass weight).
Source: FAO (1985; 1986a; 1989); FAO trade yearbook (1985); ILCA (1987b).
Table 10. Average annual trade in milk by country, selected periods. 1
Exports
Milk trade ('000 1 of LME)
Imports Net exports or in-
1971-73 1977-79
iports (-)
Country 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1971-73 1977-79 1983-85 1983-85
C6te d'lvoire 2.5 1.2 1.2 55.4 121.7 129.5 -52.9 -120.5 -128.3
Ethiopia 0.1 0.1 0.0 6.4 26.4 114.0 -63 -26.3 -114.0
Mali 0.0 0.0 ao 10.4 22.2 24.4 -10.4 -22.2 -24.4
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 224.5 588.3 371.8 -224.5 -588.3 -371.8
Sudan 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.8 34.5 93.0 -16.8 -34.5 -93.0
Zimbabwe 0.3 2.3 0.7 9.7 4.5 18.7 -9.4 -2.2 -18.0
SSA 38.5 29.2 3.7 751.2 1580.2 2014.0 -712.6 -1551.0 -2010.4
1. Trade data on milk include fresh, dried, condensed and evaporated milk and are expressed in terms of liquid milk
equivalent (LME) using FAO (1978) conversion factors, i.e. 1 kg fresh milk = 1 kg LME; 1 kg dried milk = 7.6 kg
LME and 1 kg condensed/evaporated milk = 2 kg LME.
Source: FAO tradeyearbook (various issues).
countries has been growing more slowly than
demand. The result has been a substantial increase
in imports (Table 10). In liquid milk equivalent
(LME) terms, milk imports to the study countries
increased by 10% a year between 1971-73 and
1983-85. The rapid growth in imports has been
stimulated by the availability of subsidised skimmed
milk powder from developed countries which has
been increasingly used as food aid. C6te d'lvoire and
Nigeria import more than 50% of the milk products
they consume, Mali imports about 15% while the
remaining three countries import between 5 and
10%.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Although the output, consumption and trade trends
presented above need to be interpreted with
caution, their underlying message is clear:
production of meat and milk in the study countries
over the last 15 years has risen only slightly or has
declined. The gap between production and
consumption, which was very narrow at the
beginning of the period, has widened significantly.
As a result, there has been a growing tendency to
import to meet demand, particularly for milk.
Domestic production has been unable to
satisfy demand due to a variety of constraints,
including environmental and technological
problems. However, the incentive policies pursued
by most governments have also contributed
significantly (Schultz, 1978; World Bank, 1981;
World Bank, 1983). Often the effects of these
policies have run counter to the producers' interests,
though such was not the intention. For example,
policies that place ceilings on meat and milk prices
at the producer and retail levels or impose export
taxes have been blamed for inhibiting growth in
production while subsidising domestic
consumption.
The realisation of expanded and sustainable
meat and milk production has also not been made
easy by the numerous goals pursued within the
livestock subsector and the lack of agreement on
trade-offs between policies. For example, rural dairy
production is labour-intensive and the employment
effects from its expansion can be substantial. For
rural producers with relatively modest incomes, it
can be reasonably argued on equity grounds that
governments should consider protecting them from
concessionary imports; whereas livestock policy
goals, if they are formulated to provide "cheap" milk
to urban consumers may lead to an altogether
different set of policy recommendations.
Thus, understanding the interrelationships
and conflicts between objectives and policies is a
critical step towards designing and implementing
more effective incentive regimes. The multiple
objectives of pricing policies and the trade-offs
inherent in the pursuance of such objectives are
examined in detail in the next chapter.

OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF
LIVESTOCK PRICING POLICIES
In almost every country, developed and developing
alike, governments intervene in agricultural
markets. In particular, all African states formulate
and implement policies which affect agricultural and
food prices. The reasons for government
intervention in price determination are many and
varied.
This chapter begins with a description of the
process of price formation in a free market in order
to provide a benchmark against which subsequent
discussions of government intervention in pricing
policy can be viewed. It then reviews the multiple
objectives of livestock price policies in the selected
countries and analyses the main instruments
employed to influence both producer and consumer
prices. It examines the conflicts that often arise
among the different policy objectives and assesses
the appropriateness of some of the instruments in
use. It concludes with a discussion of the arguments
that have been advanced to rationalise government
intervention in pricing policies.
PRICE FORMATION IN A FREE MARKET
The process of price formation and the level of
prices in a free market can be used as the norm by
which market behaviour and prices obtained under
government intervention can be evaluated. In this
respect, it is useful to consider first, a situation where
a commodity market in a given country is isolated
from the world market and, second, a situation
where free trade is possible. Given the
characteristics of the study countries, it is also
helpful to distinguish between the product forwhich
a country is a potential importer (say, milk) and that
for which a country is a potential exporter (say,
beef).
In Figure la, the supply curve Sd shows the
quantity of milk supplied per time period at different
prices by producers in country 1. The demand curve
Dd shows the quantity of milk demanded per time
period at different prices by consumers in the same
country. Since in this example the market for milk is
isolated from the rest of the world, the
market-clearing equilibrium is achieved with
quantity Q sold at price P .
In Figure lb, the supply curve S represents
the total quantity of milk supplied to the world
market per time period at different prices by all
other countries. D represents the quantity
demanded from the world market by all other
countries. Market-clearing equilibrium is
established in the world market with Q traded at
price Pw.
If the barriers that previously prevented trade
with international markets are now removed, the
outcome is quite different from the earlier result
without international trade. Milk can now be traded
at the border of country 1 at price P , the world
price,5 which is below the domestic market-clearing
A distinction can be made between interventions due to market failures and interventions arising from other motives.
The former set of interventions can be justified on theoretical grounds, but the general body of literature on the
price policies of developing countries takes a very negative view of the latter. It is the latter set of interventions that
are considered in this chapter.
It is assumed here that since the production and consumption of milk in country 1 is very small in comparison to the
quantity traded internationally, the effect on the world price of country l's market becoming integrated with the rest
of the world trading system is negligible. This is sometimes referred to as the"small country" assumption. The same
assumption holds for the second case described in Figure 2.
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price, P . Domestic demand increases from Q to
Qd and domestic supply falls from Qo to Qf. The
gap, Qd-Qs is now imported from the world market
at price P .
Figure 2 illustrates the second market situation
where a country is a potential exporter of beef.
When the domestic market is isolated from the
world market, Q of beef is sold at price P . With
free trade between country 2 and the rest of the
world, domestic consumption decreases to Q ,
domestic production increases to Q , and a quantity
equal to 0 -Q is exported to the world market at
price P .
Figures 1 and 2 also show the welfare
gains/losses resulting from trade. Figure la indicates
that by importing milk at P , consumers in country
1 are better off in two ways: they can buy their
original quantity of milk Q at the lower price Pw,
and they can increase the amount consumed to Qd.
Their welfare gain is the area abfc, which is
sometimes referred to as the increase in consumer
surplus. This increase in consumer surplus is the
amount of money consumers would have been
willing to pay to consume the additional quantity
Qd-Oo but do not need to pay because they can
purchase all the milk they want at P . This gain in
consumer welfare is obtained partially at the
expense of domestic producers. In the absence of
trade, total producer revenue is equal to abjg; total
producer cost is bjh. The producer surplus or
income is equal to the difference, abhg. With the fall
in price to P , producer incomes fall by the amount
abed. This is a loss in producer welfare which
accrues to consumers because of the fall in price.
It is obvious from Figure la that consumers
have gained more than producers have lost.
Consumers could reimburse producers for their
losses and would still be net gainers by areabfd. This
triangle represents the gains from trade.
Similarly, in Figure 2 the welfare gains from
free trade in beef compared to the situation where
country 2's market is isolated from the world
market, are represented by the area of the triangle
bcf. This is the excessof the gain in producer surplus,
abefd over the loss in consumer surplus, abfd
These results thus indicate that trade can
provide a net gain in economic surplus for countries
1 and 2. Although not shown here, it can also be
demonstrated that with free trade a country can
maximise the welfare gains from trade. However,
several important points are hidden in the
apparently simple analyses presented above.
First, the world price P , is usually quoted in
foreign currency (e.g. US dollars). To make Pw
comparable to the domestic price, P , a conversion
at some exchange rate is required. The rate that is
used obviously has a significant effect on how P
compares with P .
Second, as shown above, the opportunity to
trade internationally creates several adjustments in
the domestic commodity market. For one thing, it
changes the price facing domestic producers and
consumers of the commodity in question. This has
important implications for income distribution and
resource allocation and, perhaps more importantly,
for other commodities and the entire economy.
Third, international commodity markets are
notoriously unstable and fragmented. For livestock
products, this instability arises partly as a result of
climatic and biological conditions and partly due to
inadequate information and knowledge about
current and expected economic opportunities. The
result, often, is wide fluctuations in world prices
which, in turn, can cause large fluctuations in the
incomes of farmers or, in the case of exporting
countries, in foreign exchange earnings.
These fluctuations can go beyond what a
government is willing to accept and hence may
attempt to institute some measure of price
stabilisation.
The points raised above, while by no means
exhaustive, do provide a basis for understanding
why governments have rarely been prepared to
allow free international trade and accept the prices
that ensue from it. While government pricing
interventions may arise out of a misunderstanding
of the relationship between trade and social welfare,
often the departure from free trade arises because
a government wants to achieve objectives that may
pertain to safeguarding public welfare or raising
government revenue. The next section examines
some of these objectives.
OBJECTIVES OF LIVESTOCK
PRICING POLICIES
Although there are many different objectives
behind livestock pricing policies pursued in the study
countries, they can be summarised under six
headings, viz: food self-sufficiency, export
promotion, stabilisation and inflation control,
government revenue generation, improved
nutrition and employment creation. The specific
livestock development objectives pursued in each of
the selected countries are shown in Table 11. While
the objectives are, to a certain extent, mutually
reinforcing, in a number of cases there can be
conflict between them.
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Table 11. Major livestockpolicy goals in the study countries, 1975-85.
Country
,. Ethiopia Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
Self-sufficiency
Export promotion
Stabilisation and inflation
control
Government revenue
generation
Improved nutrition
Employment creation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
The following notes sketch the main features
of the objectives listed summarily above.
The self-sufficiency objective
Of all the stated objectives, the basically
consumer-oriented objective of attaining meat and
milk self-sufficiency ranked as the most common.
As Table 1 1 indicates, this objective is sought after
by all the study countries. This is not surprising given
the nutritional importance of meat and milk in the
diet and the political risks associated with shortages
of these products. Equally important is the desire to
reduce dependence on imports in the face of foreign
exchange shortages and unpredictable world prices.
Ideally, the self-sufficiency objective could be
achieved by following a producer-oriented price
policy. This was the approach followed by the
Republic of Korea in the 1960s and particularly
since 1970 with respect to rice. By raising the real
producer price of rice and implementing other
price-related incentive measures, Korea was able to
achieve self-sufficiency in rice in 1977 while the yield
of rice per hectare outstripped that ofJapan and the
United States (Paukert, 1988).
While similar policies could, in principle, be
applied to the livestock subsector, this has not
usually been the practice in SSA where priority has
been given instead to cheap food policies that have
benefited consumers more than producers. As can
6. Self-sufficiency was an important goal in the study countries from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. Government
documents now refer to the goal of improved food security in livestock projects. The two terms are often used
interchangeably, but they are not synonymous. Food self-sufficiency aims at meeting all the staple food needs of a
country from domestic production. It is a narrower concept than food security which aims at ensuring access for all
at all times to a level of food sufficient for an active and healthy life (World Bank, 1986a). The two key components
of food security are food availability (through domestic production and/or trade) and food access (through home
production or purchase).
7. Defined as the ratio of domestic production to total consumption.
be seen in Chapter 4, even in those instances where
producer prices have risen, restrictive trade and
exchange rate policies have been partly responsible
for those increases.
More importantly, judging by the production
and consumption trends presented in the previous
chapter, self-sufficiency in meat and milk has not
been achieved for any considerable length of time in
most of the study countries. In fact, the self-
sufficiency ratios7 of meat and more so of milk have
tended to decline over the last 10 years, although
there are considerable fluctuations in the ratios
among countries and between consecutive years.
Thus, while the Korean example and other
similar cases indicate that appropriate pricing
policies can move a country toward the goal of
self-sufficiency, inappropriate policies, on the other
hand, can lead to outcomes that are exactly opposite
to those intended or at least stated. It is important
to note here that most of the study countries,
undoubtedly, possess considerable animal
resources. However, there are virtually no detailed
analyses of the comparative advantage that each
country has in the production of particular livestock
products. Such studies dealing with issues
concerning international markets, appropriate
border price policies and foreign exchange
management, can give policy makers an idea of the
feasibility or desirability of achieving self-su fficiency
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by providing a unified framework for assessing the
advantages that a country has in the production of
meat and/or milk.
The export promotion objective
This objective stems from the desire of most
governments to improve the contribution of the
livestock subsector to net foreign exchange
earnings. It is another frequently expressed
production objective of livestock products pricing
policy. As Table 1 1 indicates, it is important in four
of the six selected countries.
Generally, the rate of growth of exports will
depend on the stimulus from export markets and on
the incentives provided by domestic price and trade
policies. However, even with a strong external
stimulus, domestic price policies may still impede
the growth of exports in several ways. First, it is
obvious that exports of livestock and their products
will increase only if growth of production exceeds
growth of domestic consumption. This might
require producer prices to rise to border price levels
to spur production and restrict consumption. But if
prices are controlled at both the producer and
consumer levels, this may discourage production
and encourage consumption — the opposite of the
desired effect of promoting export.
Secondly, the manner in which the state
intervenes in export marketing can have a profound
impact on the level of exports. In most SSA
countries, export marketing is under tight
government control, when not a state monopoly.
These intervention agencies have been used in the
past as instruments of taxation with often negative
consequences for exports.
In addition, inappropriate exchange rate
policies can have deleterious effects on the
development of the livestock export sector. Indeed,
it has been argued that part of SSA's decline in
agricultural exports stems from lack of international
competitiveness as a result of overvalued exchange
rates, export taxation etc (FAO, 1986b; Oyejide,
1986). The relative importance of these direct and
indirect price control policies in promoting or
inhibiting the growth of livestock output, including
exports, in the study countries is examined
empirically in Chapter 5.
8. Among the livestock exporting countries considered in this study, government parastatals intervene directly in export
marketing by pun. h.ising and exporting livestock and animal products in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, while the parastatals
provide only regulatory and service functions in Mali and Sudan.
The inflation control and market
stabilisation objectives
Livestock production is inherently unstable given its
dependence on climatic and other environmental
conditions. This instability is a major source of price
fluctuations for livestock products. The stabilisation
objective can take two forms: price and income.
With respect to the former, the aim is to minimise
price fluctuations with a view to shield both
consumers and producers from the full impact of
erratic nominal price variations. The income
stabilisation objective, on the other hand, is basically
producer-oriented. For instance, Nigeria's
agricultural policy document states that one of the
policy objectives of the livestock subsector is to
improve and stabilise rural income emanating from
livestock production and processing (Nigeria, 1988).
The aim here is to reduce the fluctuations in prices
which may lead to an undesired change in real
incomes of producers.
Virtually all the countries studied included
price stabilisation objectives in their agricultural
policies. A common mechanism for reducing
abnormal fluctuations in agricultural prices is for a
government agency to act as buyer and seller of last
resort, entering the market to purchase supplies
when prices are very low and selling later when
diminishing supplies drive up prices. However, this
kind of measure has not been applied to the
livestock sector of the study countries mainly
because of the perishability of the products, relying
instead, on consumer price controls in countries
pursuing this objective (e.g. Cote d'lvoire, Mali,
Sudan and Zimbabwe). At the same time, pricing
policies aimed at reducing year-to-year fluctuations
have been pursued, particularly in Zimbabwe, to
protect producers against losses caused by the
vagaries of weather and price fluctuations in the
world market.
At this point, it is perhaps useful to distinguish
between seasonal and erratic (i.e. atypical) price
variations. Seasonal price variations ofa regular type
serve a useful purpose by reconciling demand with
seasonally changing supply and production costs.
Conversely, erratic price variations create
uncertainty for producers which may retard
specialisation and lead to faulty production
decisions. Also, low-income consumers are
particularly vulnerable to sudden price surges. Thus,
attempts to eliminate seasonal price fluctuations
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altogether by relying, for example, on consumer
price controls often destroys the incentive for
private sector inter-temporal arbitrage and
increases the need for further government
intervention. A policy aimed at reducing erratic
price variations, on the other hand, can help lessen
the uncertainty about future prices. This can
encourage private dealers to engage in
inter-temporal arbitrage, for example, by buying
animals in areas of feed shortage and moving them
to areas with more fodder or processing facilities to
overcome problems ofperishability. These practices
will also benefit consumers ultimately. However,
this requires making the distinction between
seasonal and erratic price variation, which is rarely
done.
Another pertinent point is that some
economists have argued that what is of crucial
importance to producers is stabilising their income,
not stabilising the prices of their produce (Stiglitz,
1987). Their argument is that if price and quantity
are negatively correlated, stabilising prices may
actually exacerbate the fluctuations in income.
There is some validity in this argument, particularly
with respect to beef production, since other studies
have established that the short-run slaughter
response is almost always in a direction opposite to
the current change in domestic producer price
(Rodriguez, 1985; Jarvis, 1986).
Turning to the inflation control objective, the
underlying motive is that it is necessary to keep down
producer prices in order to make exports
competitive and to constrain consumer price
increases which could put upward pressure on wage
levels and the prices of manufactured goods.
However, a fact that is often ignored is that price
policy alone cannot be used to keep inflation in
check. The experiences of some of the countries
studied indicate that price controls will fail to curb,
and may even exacerbate, inflation. This happens
when the fixed prices for meat and milk and other
consumer goods are too low in relation to existing
supply and demand. Scarcity of goods sold at
controlled prices rapidly develops, and a parallel
market is created with prices higher than would exist
in the absence of price controls. Producers faced
with unattractive prices shun or reduce their
supplies to the official marketing agencies and sell
instead on the parallel market. As a result, the
proportion of goods sold at the controlled prices
falls, while the proportion of parallel market sales
grows, with an inflationary effect. Sudan and
Zimbabwe have lately experienced this problem
with regard to milk and meat, respectively.
The government revenue raising objective
Another objective of pricing policy is to raise
revenue for government development tasks. The
principal source of government revenue is, of
course, taxation. Hade taxes (e.g. import tariffs and
export taxes) are commonly used in all the study
countries. In Mali, for example, the World Bank
(1975) estimated that export taxes together with
other levies and fees (e.g. butchers' and cattle
dealers' licences, slaughtering fees etc) contributed
about 6% of total public revenues (amounting to
FCFA 11 612 million) in 1970-72. Apart from
generating revenue, trade taxes also have an
important influence on the prices received and paid
by producers and consumers: export taxes on
livestock products tend to lower domestic prices,
while import tariffs tend to raise domestic prices.
In addition, pricing policy has often been
pressed into service to raise government revenue
because most developing countries lack an
adequate administrative base for imposing direct
taxes. The main instrument for this is the marketing
board that purchases livestock products at low
prices and either resells them domestically or
exports them, at higher prices. The difference, which
constitutes the government's profit from livestock
price policy, can be a significant addition to
government revenue.
The Livestock and Meat Corporation (LMC)
of Ethiopia and the Cold Storage Commission
(CSC) in Zimbabwe were partly set up for this
purpose. Unfortunately, over the last few years, the
governments of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have had
to subsidise these agencies instead of deriving
revenue from them. In the case of the CSC, the
problem arises partly because it has the
responsibility ofpurchasing beef for domestic as well
as export marketing. Until 1983, Zimbabwe
pursued a cheap beef for consumers policy. CSC's
export earnings were used to subsidise and lower the
consumer price of beef. Thus, the Government of
Zimbabwe was indirectly taxing producers while
subsidising consumers. Even then the export
earnings of the CSC could have added to
government revenue, but the government chose
instead to use the funds to reduce the cost of
keeping consumer beef prices low.
The improved nutrition objective
This objective plays a prominent part in the
justification of pricing policies in two of the study
countries (Table 1 1). Its aim is to increase the level
of household consumption of animal proteins
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—superficially, a highly praiseworthy objective. Its
implementation is, however, problematic.
Ideally, for this objective to be achieved,
producer prices need to be high enough to provide
producers adequate incentives to expand output
while keeping consumer prices low enough, or at
least designed in such a way as to enable the poorer
classes to benefit more than the wealthier ones. But
a marked increase in the prices of meat and milk to
encourage production can have a significant impact
in threatening the standard of living of urban
workers, leading to demands for higher wages and
creating inflationary pressures in the economy.
Moreover, attempts to increase food prices
suddenly, as in Sudan in early 1985, have frequently
been the immediate reasons for strikes and riots.
However, attempts to suppress consumer price
increases through subsidies can put an enormous
strain on government budgets, leading to increased
government borrowing and a possible expansion in
the money supply that in itself can be inflationary.
Zimbabwe, for example, experienced problems
emanating from escalating consumer subsidies in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
More importantly, the use of consumer
subsidies means favouring the urban sector (rich
and poor) at the expense of the rural population
since such schemes are easier to administer in cities
than in inaccessible rural areas. Also, if consumer
prices are reduced by paying producers low prices,
urbanitcs (rich and poor) again benefit at the
expense of rural dwellers and this may discourage
expansion of output. Thus this objective,
meritorious at first sight, can be very negative from
the point of view increasing production and the
equitable distribution of benefits, if adequate care is
not taken in its implementation. In terms ofconcrete
achievement, available evidence presented
elsewhere (Williams, 1989) indicates that not much
progress has been made toward the attainment of
this objective, for example, in Nigeria. The situation
is not largely different in Zimbabwe, the other
country pursuing this objective.
stem the tide of rural to urban migration and ease
the pressure on social amenities in the cities.
Further, since average rural incomes are often
several times lower than average urban incomes, it
is not surprising that governments concerned with
long-term agricultural development are willing to
consider using pricing policy to encourage more
labour intensive livestock production systems.
High producer prices that will provide the
incentive for expanding production through
adoption of innovative approaches constitute a
necessary condition for the attainment of the
employment creation objective. As can be seen from
the next chapter, real livestock producer prices
increased slightly over the past decade in two of the
countries pursuing this objective. Nevertheless,
evidence of an upward trend in real producer prices
does not resolve the question of whether these
prices rose enough to encourage the kind of
investment needed to create additional employment
opportunities. Besides, other technical production
problems and economic policies pursued in some of
these countries have worked to offset whatever
incentive was forthcoming from the rising producer
prices. For example, in Nigeria beginning in the
1970s the government established a number ofdairy
processing plants near the major urban centres. The
milk for processing was to come from associated
government dairy farms and from local collection.
However, the inadequate purchase prices offered by
the plants made local milk collection difficult . The
plants' production activities started relying on
reconstituting imported powdered milk which was
cheaper than locally produced milk because of
depressed international prices and appreciation of
the real exchange rate of the Naira during this
period. Thus, both internal and external factors have
militated against the attainment of the employment
objective. The picture just painted for Nigeria is not
altogether atypical of the situation in the other
countries attempting to implement this objective.
The employment creation objective
The idea underlying this objective is to use pricing
policy to provide rural employment through
expanded livestock production, processing and
marketing. The labour intensive nature of some
aspects of livestock production (e.g. dairy
production) suggests that the direct and indirect
employment effects of expansion can be substantial.
Such rural employment opportunities can help to
INSTRUMENTS OF LIVESTOCK
PRODUCTS PRICING POLICIES
Before examining the conflict inherent in
attempting to implement the aforementioned
objectives, it will be useful to review briefly the
instruments through which livestock pricing policies
are applied. Although there are a variety of
intervention tools for influencing livestock product
prices, the main instruments in use in the study
countries are summarised in Table 12.
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Table 12. Major instruments oflivestockproducts pricingpolicies in the study countries, 1975-85.
Country
Instrument C6te
d'lvoire
Ethiopia Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
Controlled producer prices X X
Controlled consumer prices X X X X
Input subsidies X X
Consumer price subsidies X
Import tariffs X X X X X
Import licences X X X X X
Foreign exchange allocations X X X X
Export taxes X X X
Export licences X X
As the table clearly shows, no single instrument
is ever used alone in a country. Frequently, a
number of instruments are used concurrently.
Understanding the interrelationships between
instruments is of crucial importance in designing
effective price policies. In what follows, the pricing
instruments listed summarily in Table 12 are
discussed under four major headings: price controls;
price subsidies; import measures and export
measures.
Price controls
Controlled or administered producer prices are
used by governments in some of the countries
studied to implement purchase price policies for
basic food and exportable commodities. A
complementary instrument, in the form of a
marketing board, is usually employed in conjunction
with price controls. Despite the great difference in
the countries' situations, the basic approach is to
establish fixed or minimum producer prices for the
commodities under consideration, with a parastatal
purchasing part of the total output. In determining
the level at which to fix producer prices, various
considerations including technical, economic and
political factors are often taken into account. An
example of this basic model is provided by the
producer price policy of Zimbabwe with regard to
beef and milk.
The parastatals responsible for the purchase
and marketing of these two commodities are the
Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and the Dairy
Marketing Board (DMB), both under the control of
the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). The
producer price-fixing process begins when the AMA
conducts initial hearings with farmers' associations
on the cost of production incurred within alternative
commercial farming systems. Based on the
submissions of the farmers' associations and on the
trading accounts received from the CSC and DMB,
the AMA makes recommendations on producer
prices to the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter also
holds meetings with farmers' associations to get
their views on pricing issues. On the basis of these
meetings, the ministry's own cost estimate of
production, and on the AMA's recommendations,
the Minister of Agriculture in consultation with the
appropriate senior officials then decides on the
appropriate producer prices to recommend to the
Ministerial Economic Co-ordinating Committee
(MECC), which is composed of the ministers of the
relevant ministries. After considering AMA's
proposals, MECC makes recommendations to the
cabinet where the final decision on producer prices
is taken. The producer prices arrived at in this
fashion are then implemented by the CSCandDMB
in their purchases of beef and milk from livestock
producers.
There are variations to this process of
producer price fixing in terms of the relative weight
given to economic and political considerations.
However, some aspects of this basic approach can
be found in Ethiopia and, to a limited extent, in
Sudan especially with regard to milk produced by
the government-sponsored Kuku Cooperative
Dairy Production Scheme and in the cattle ranching
and fattening operations of Socidtd de
ddveloppement des productions animales
(SODEPRA) in northern Cdte d'lvoire.
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Having decided on producer prices to be paid
by parastatals, governments may again intervene by
stipulating the prices at which their agencies must
sell their products on the domestic market. In cases
where the agencies' domestic selling prices (set by
government) are inadequate to cover their handling
costs and the costs of purchasing products at the
government-guaranteed producer prices, subsidy
payments may be needed. For example, in
Zimbabwe in 1984 and 1986, the CSC needed 8.5
million and 6.0 million Zimbabwean dollars,
respectively, because of trading deficits incurred as
a result ofgovernment control ofboth purchase and
wholesale selling prices (CSC, unpublished data).
At the other end of the spectrum, consumer
prices set by official decree are also prevalent in
most of the study countries (Table 12). This
instrument is normally intended to check price rises
in order to hold down increases in the cost of living
and to make livestock products available to
low-income consumers at affordable prices. The
consumer prices set in this manner are, therefore,
ceiling prices. Frequently, a subsidy is involved as
indicated, for example, by a Zimbabwean
government policy document which noted that "for
a number of decades past governments pursued a
policy aimed at keeping the prices of basic
foodstuffs, i.e. maize meal, meat ..., as low as
possible, whilst at the same time set producer prices
at a level high enough to guarantee that consumer
demand was met. Such a policy involved direct
government intervention through the payment of
subsidies to bridge the difference between official
procurement prices and official selling prices since
any increase in producer prices, if allowed to be
passed on to the final consumer, would place an
unacceptable burden on the majority of the
population at the lower income level" (Zimbabwe
Gov't, 1988).
While rationing appears to be an important
complement to consumer price controls as it limits
demand to the amount of goods available at the
fixed price, it is not commonly used in the study
countries. Thus, in the absence of rationing,
consumer price control tends to be either ignored
or, when enforced (at considerable financial cost to
the government), give rise to a parallel market with
much higher prices to consumers.
Furthermore, past experience in some of the
study countries has emphasised the frequent
tendency for price control regimes to be unduly
rigid, raising difficulties when changes are required
as happened, for example, in Sudan in 1985. Also,
consumer price controls can hinder the flow ofgood
quality animals to domestic markets, especially
during periods of limited supply, because butchers
may hold back on purchases due to doubts about
their ability to operate at reasonable profit margins.
The net effect is to reduce beef supply in those areas
where price control is enforced. However, price
controls are increasingly recognised as the wrong
instrument for providing cheap food to urban
consumers and for carrying the main burden ofanti-
inflationary policies. For these reasons, as well as
prodding by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, decontrolling of prices is now
taking place in virtually all of the study countries
applying this instrument.
Input and consumer price subsidies
Input subsidies are an integral part of livestock price
policy in two of the study countries (Table 12). The
motive behind input subsidisation is to provide
incentives to producers, not by raising the price of
their products, but, rather, by lowering their costs of
production. Measures, which may include subsidies
for credit, concentrate feeding, veterinary services,
transportation and reduced import duties, are
frequently designed to bring about increased
livestock production by encouraging producers to
use modern technical packages. In Cdte d'lvoire, for
example, SODEPRA provides subsidised feeds,
drugs and veterinary services to livestock producers
in the northern part of the country.
In Nigeria, immediately after independence,
regional governments helped finance the
introduction and distribution of concentrate feeds
to pastoralists. Also during the oil boom, i.e.
1975-1983, the federal government made credit
available to livestock producers at concessionary
rates to promote the use of new inputs. In addition,
the government has been encouraging commercial
banks to lend to livestock producers by absorbing
some of the risks involved through the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme. This scheme,
established in 1978, guarantees loans made by
commercial banks to the agricultural sector and thus
serves to lower the price of credit for those seeking
capital to invest in food and livestock production.
Loan guarantee statistics showed that between 1978
and 1986, total guaranteed loans amounted to 316.9
million Naira out of which 173.9 million, or about
55%, went to livestock production.
Moreover, the Nigerian Government has
sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to cheapen the price
of land for livestock and other agricultural
production projects. The government's land decree
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of March 1978 reserves for the state governments,
rural land not under active exploitation. The prime
objective of the decree is to make it easier for the
state governments to acquire land for public
purposes, including the establishment oflarge- scale
grazing reserves and ranching schemes.
Unfortunately, as argued elsewhere, these input
price reducing measures have not been totally
effective in raising the level of livestock production
in Nigeria (Williams, 1989). For the most part, these
instruments have been manipulated to benefit the
large-scale commercial livestock producers at the
expense of the small-scale pastoralists who account
for the bulk of livestock production in the country.
In contrast to input subsidies intended
primarily for producers, consumer price subsidies
represent a real effort to keep down the prices of
food including livestock products consumed by most
of the populace. The cost of this policy is borne
either by agricultural producers in the form of low
purchase prices or, more often, by the government.
Once implemented, consumer subsidies are difficult
to withdraw or to reduce substantially. However,
because governments naturally attempt to limit this
cost in one way or another, there are a number of
differing subsidy instruments.
The most general, i.e. untargeted subsidy,
consists of subsidising the consumer prices of a few
selected items, usually beef and milk, with no
restriction on the quantity bought and open to
everyone. Although this could benefit all income
classes to the extent of their purchases of the
subsidised commodities, more often than not, the
urban population benefits most on account of its
higher incomes and political clout. Such an
untargeted subsidy frequently runs counter to the
goal of equity, and may actually increase inequality.
At the same time and because of the extent of
consumer coverage, it is an extremely costly policy
putting a huge burden on government budgets. This
policy instrument of consumer price subsidy is used
in Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to beef, and
less explicitly in those countries (e.g. Sudan and
Mali) where governments attempt to enforce
consumer price controls.
Another instrument that is also implicitly used
in Zimbabwe is targeted subsidies which attempt to
direct consumer subsidies to certain designated
groups, for whom low-priced food is essential, while
containing budgetary costs. The containment of
budgetary costs is pursued indirectly through
geographical targeting and self-targeting.
Geographical targeting is based on locating retail
shops in areas inhabited mainly by low-income
groups. For example, the CSC in Zimbabwe has
established a number of tru-stores (i.e. retail
outlets) in high population density areas to provide
consumers with low-quality beef at affordable (i.e.
effectively subsidised) prices.
The self-targeting approach, which relies
mainly on the fact that different income groups have
different food consumption habits, has also been
advocated in Zimbabwe as a way of reducing the
budgetary costs to the government of beef and milk
subsidies. Its justification lies in the fact that
low-grade beef and milk consumers dominate the
domestic beef and milk demand in Zimbabwe. For
example, a government policy document estimates
that demand for low and high quality beef stands at
92 and 8%, respectively, of total domestic demand.
The same document goes on to state that "our
domestic market is dominated by low-income
consumers and is extremely sensitive to price
changes" (Zimbabwe Gov't, 1988). Similarly,
sterilised milk, with a longer shelf life, is more
popular in the rural areas than fresh milk. Thus,
subsidies are concentrated on low-quality beef and
sterilised milk consumed predominantly by the
poor, rather than high-grade beef and fresh milk
consumed relatively more by the middle- and
upper-income classes.
Import duties and quantitative import
restrictions
Import tariffs are one of the traditional and most
widely used instruments for raising the prices of
imports and are used in virtually all the countries
studied. They can be manipulated to give local
producers whatever degree of protection is desired
by insulating domestic prices from international
price fluctuations and from the effects of imports
subsidised at their source. This is precisely what the
government of Cote d'lvoire has done to stem the
downward pressure on domestic cattle and beef
prices arising from imports of highly subsidised beef
from the European Community (EC). Since 1983,
the Ivoirien government has imposed import duties
ofapproximately 25% on beef imports from the EC
to lessen the negative impact of such imports on
domestic beef prices.
9. By 1988, Five tru-stores had been opened in Harare and seven in Bulawayo. The CSC is considering opening up more
of such stores in the future( Zimbabwe Gov't, 1988).
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Import duties are also frequently used to
generate revenue and discourage the consumption
of certain products. In Nigeria, for example, the
1961 federal government's budget statement
provided the justification for subsequent use of this
instrument for raising revenue by claiming that tariff
increases were imposed upon goods consumed by
the better-off classes of the community. The
statement added that "no one could reasonably
maintain that imported meat, butter ..., constitute
indispensable or significant items in the family
budget of the low income groups which form the
bulk of our population" (Nigerian Gov't, 1987).
Thus, tariff increases were imposed to serve as
an indirect consumption tax and to raise revenue for
the government. Between 1977 and 1986 imported
livestock products attracted custom duties ranging
from 10-30% of the c.i.f. value of the imported
products.
Moreover, quantitative import restrictions,
effected through import licences, foreign exchange
allocations, physical quota limits on imports and
outright bans constitute another quick-acting and
powerful livestock policy instrument that is widely
used in some of the study countries to protect
domestic producers against competition from
cheaper import supplies. These measures are also
used to serve other ends. For instance, a 1988
Nigerian Government policy document maintained
that "to serve as an incentive for increased
production, government's ban on the importation of
beefand other meats will remain in force" (Nigerian
Gov't, 1988). However, a more powerful reason for
imposing these measures, and one that is rarely
made explicit, is the windfall gains that often accrue
to those with rights to import licences and quotas. In
the case of Nigeria, it is now well understood that
prior to the introduction of the foreign exchange
market in 1986, those responsible for trade
restrictions together with those who had access to
import licences and foreign exchange allocations
were able to gain from the rents implied by the price
differential between domestic and world prices.
Thus, a reasonable inference is that rent-seeking is
at least partly responsible for the implementation of
these import-restrictive measures in some of the
study countries.
Export taxes, licences, quotas and bans
These export-restricting instruments are widely
used in the livestock exporting countries included in
this study, to lower domestic prices and frequently
to prevent local prices from rising to international
levels when the latter lie above the former. They are
also used to ensure that domestic consumption
demands are met before any export. Thus in July
1986, the Government of Sudan imposed a ban on
livestock exports in order to satisfy domestic
consumption. Prior to that time and beginning in the
late 1970s, there was a 5% export tax on small
ruminants and their meat products, while export
duties of 20 and 15% were imposed on cattle and
beef, respectively.1 In addition to these taxes, a
would-be exporter, amongst other things, must
obtain an export licence, pay an initial export
registration fee and subsequently an annual export
registration renewal fee and must also set aside
30% of the quantity intended for export for the
domestic market. The official taxes and fees paid for
exporting cattle originating from Nyala in western
Sudan in 1983/84 are itemised in Table 13.
The specific nature of the taxes and other fees
imposed on the export of livestock and meat
products in Sudan is not unique to this country.
They are common in some of the other exporting
countries studied, including Ethiopia and Mali.
While variable taxes and levies, as temporary
measures, can improve domestic price stability, a
long-term sustained use of these price control
instruments inevitably negates the incentive to
producers and carries the danger of introducing
significant price distortions to the disadvantage of
the livestock subsector in the long-run.
Having briefly discussed the objectives and
instruments of livestock pricing policies in the study
countries, the issue of economic and political
trade-offs between the different objectives and the
difficulties often encountered in achieving desired
objectives through the chosen policy instruments
are examined in the next section.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND
PRICING INSTRUMENTS USED
The review of livestock price policy objectives in the
previous section emphasised one central point —
the multiplicity of objectives, both in the context of
individual countries as well as for all the study
10. The export duties on cattle and beef consist of a 15 and 10% export tax based on the frce-on-board (f.o.b.) value of
exports and a 5% development tax on each product based on the free-alongside-ship (f.a.s.) value of exports.
11. For a detailed account of the official levies on the export of livestock in Mali see Delgado (1980: p. 378).
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Table 13. Official taxes andfees requiredfor exporting cattle in Sudan, 1983/84. '
Item (Sudanese
pound/head)
Export registration fee
Export tax
Development tax
Clearance and seaport charges
Health fees at the port
Export service fees paid to LMMC
Bank fees for foreign exchange transactions
Omdurman market fees (including vaccination and quarantine)
Nyala market fees (including health and local taxes)
Totalc
11.70
81.92
27.31
8.00
4.00
6.00
4.20
6.68
6.08
155.89
In 1983/84, 1 Sudanese pound = US$ 0.769.
a. Cattle originating from Nyala in western Sudan.
b. Actual registration fee amortised and pro-rated over the number of animals exported.
c. Total levies may vary slightly between different producing areas due to differences in local market charges.
Sources: Sudan Gov't (1986); LMMC (1984).
countries as a group, with a consequent scope for
conflict and contradiction.
In the first instance, the possibility of conflict
between price policy objectives is indicated by the
fact that, in five out of the six countries studied, the
national policy included as objectives both the
provision of producer price incentives and the
stabilisation or lowering of consumer prices. The
dilemma here is how to ensure cheap food, including
meat and milk, for consumers without depressing
producer prices to the extent that incentives for
increased production and marketable surplus are
jeopardised. Moreover, most governments want to
safeguard the nutritional welfare of urban dwellers
and poorer income groups, while at the same time
trying to avoid the disruptive effects that rising and
unstable livestock product prices can have on the
cost of living and consequently on wage levels. In
principle, with an appropriate set of pricing
instruments, it should be possible to reconcile these
conflicting objectives, but this is rarely achieved.
This brings us to the second important point
which is that, even when an apparently
non-conflicting set of objectives (e.g. export
promotion and employment creation) is chosen,
attempting to implement them all through a single
pricing instrument may create conflicts and
inconsistencies. For example, if higher producer
prices are used to pursue the aforementioned
objectives, this may encourage increased
production, employment and may even result in
exportable surplus. However, if producer prices are
too high, domestic demand may drop and exports
may become uncompetitive thus dampening the
growth of output with a possible decline in
employment.
A somewhat different issue is the extent to
which the choice of a pricing instrument is dictated
by a primary concern for livestock policy objectives,
rather than for macro-economic objectives largely
external to the livestock subsector. For instance, a
key macro-economic variable for the livestock
subsector is the exchange rate. As can be seen in the
next chapter, until recently virtually all the study
countries maintained an overvalued exchange rate
that adversely affected the livestock subsector by
shifting the terms of trade against exports and in
favour of imports and non-tradeables.
Governments often responded to the resulting
trade imbalances by placing stiff tariffs or quotas on
imports; and yet these same measures have been
frequently justified on the grounds that they will
bring about the realisation of food self-sufficiency.
Similarly, there is a potential conflict between
achieving domestic livestock production objectives
through the price mechanism and maintaining
external trade balance. The tradeable nature of
livestock products and production inputs implies
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that the choice of a particular set of pricing
intervention instruments (e.g. import tariffs/quotas,
export taxes/subsidies and exchange rates) can have
a considerable impact on both the performance and
fortunes of the subsector, the overall balance of
payments and the growth of the national economies.
The point is simply that when pricing instruments
are used to achieve, say, macro-economic
objectives, they may have an indirect ill effect on
livestock policy objectives as they were not
implemented with the latter in mind, resulting in
inconsistencies between macro-economic objectives
and livestock policy objectives.
These problems are further compounded
when pricing decisions affecting the same
commodities or inputs are made by a variety of
government departments. For example, as indicated
in the previous section, it is not uncommon to find
the producer prices of meat and milk being
determined by a ministry of agriculture, while a
ministry of trade and commerce is responsible for
fixing consumer prices. At the same time, interest
rates for credit schemes and the foreign exchange
rate that affects the domestic price of exports and
imported livestock products, are usually set by the
ministry of finance or the central bank. Frequently,
definite positions based on different criteria are
assumed by the different government departments
before co-ordination of their pricing decisions is
taken. In some cases, such co-ordination is
inadequate or non-existent. As a result, there can be
confusion regarding objectives and approaches and
the pricing instruments may be used in ways
different from those originally intended.
Altogether these problems raise doubts as to
the degree of effective control that governments
have in using the price mechanism to achieve some
of their declared livestock policy objectives. It is
fairly obvious that several of the goals discussed in
the previous section are conflicting, yet
governments in most cases still pursue them. The
question is raised: Why do governments persist in
pursuing these goals through price intervention
policies? This is examined in the next section.
REASONS FOR GOVERNMENT PRICING
INTERVENTION POLICIES
Although there now exists a wide variety of
arguments on why governments intervene in
agricultural pricing, two strands of the debate are
relevant to this study. On the one hand, some
economists like Stiglitz (1987) have argued that to
understand the nature of government interventions
in agricultural markets, one must approach the
problem from the perspective of the second best.
The main problem is that most developing countries
do not have the administrative capacity to
implement an effective and equitable income tax
system. As a result, the marginal social cost for
implementing an income tax system may be unduly
high. According to Stiglitz, failure to recognise this
fact, i.e. the lack of a first-best solution to revenue
generation, has given rise to much ofthe controversy
over state intervention. Thus, naive views
advocating non-interference and free markets, or
even the more sophisticated view based on optimal
tax theory that government should not impose trade
taxes, become untenable once it is recognised that
government has limited instruments for collecting
revenue (implying that some distortionary taxation
is necessary) and redistributing income (so that one
way of improving the welfare of the poor may be
through taxes on commodities consumed by the
rich, with revenue so generated used to subsidise the
poor).
On the other hand, those in the public choice
tradition like Robert Bates (1981) argue that
misguided price intervention policies pursued by
governments in Africa are the result ofshort-sighted
decisions made by rulers on the basis of political
self-interest. For Bates, the impartiality of the state
cannot be taken for granted. Rather, the elite
controlling state power often pursues policies
designed to maintain itself in power. He argues that
policies which appear incomprehensible and
irrational make perfect sense when viewed from this
angle. Thus, price intervention policies which exploit
the rural sector in many African countries can be
understood once it is recognised that farmers and
pastoralists make poor coalition partners because of
their limited political power and resources
extracted from them are used to benefit the elite
directly or strengthen its power by appeasing the
better organised and more powerful urban
population. Similarly, Ghai and Smith (1987) argue
that government control over the agricultural
marketing system (through marketing boards,
import licences and foreign exchange allocations)
brings with it control over substantial resource flows
that governments may use for their own purposes or
allow different groups or individuals to enjoy as a
way of dispensing political patronage.
Undoubtedly, the various perspectives of this
debate on government intervention are valuable
and need to be carefully scrutinised. Nonetheless,
the wide variety of policies pursued by governments
in the study countries and their different outcomes
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suggests that the relative importance of these relevance of these different perspectives in
explanations will differ from country to country. The explaining the behaviour of governments in the
evidence presented in this chapter on the objectives study countries,
and instruments of livestock price policies shows the
Figure 1. Supply and demandframeworkforpriceformation: Case 1
Price Price 
O Qs Q0 Q,j Quantity
(a) Domestic market in country 1 for milk.
O Q„
(b) World market for milk.
Quantity
Figure 2. Supply and demandframework forprice formation: Case 2
Price
Price 
Quantity
(a) Domestic market in country 2 for beef. (b) World market for beef.
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THE EFFECT OF PRICE INTERVENTION POLICIES
ON LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS
Having examined the goals of livestock pricing
policies and the main mechanisms through which
prices are influenced in the study countries,
attention is turned in this chapter to an analysis of
the official price data on livestock products. The
price data are analysed with aview to determine how
successful governments have been in meeting some
of their stated pricing policy objectives and to
measure the impact of price intervention policies on
production incentives and consumer prices. The
methodology used for the analysis is set out in
Appendix 1. The sources and limitations of the data
used and the constraints which they impose on the
interpretation of the results are also discussed in
Appendix 1.
In what follows, we first examine empirical
evidence on the real producer prices and the real
border equivalent producer prices of livestock
products. Next, variations in the two prices over
time are analysed and nominal protection
coefficients (NPCs) are estimated to establish the
relative degree of implicit taxation or subsidisation
of producers. The trend in real consumer prices is
then examined and NPCs are also estimated for
consumers. The chapter concludes by drawing out
the implications of the results for livestock
production incentives and for government
effectiveness in influencing prices to achieve their
objectives.
THE REAL PRODUCER PRICE OF
UVESTOCK PRODUCTS
Real producer prices, obtained by deflating
farm-gate prices by the consumer price index (CPI),
provide a direct, albeit incomplete, measure of
incentives provided to livestock producers when
technology and prices for inputs are held constant.
The incentives are transmitted through the cost of
consumer goods as measured by the CPI and will
generate income and work/leisure substitution
effects as a result of changes in the real returns to
labour.1 Viewed in this light, the incentive
(disincentive) effect arises when the prices received
by the producer exhibit a significant upward
(downward) trend relative to the cost-of-living index
as measured by the CPI. This means that producers
receive an incentive when nominal producer prices
rise faster than inflation and a disincentive when
domestic inflation exceeds the rise in nominal
producer prices and thus erodes the purchasing
power of producers' income. In countries where
producer prices are fixed, real producer prices will
rise when official prices are raised much faster than
inflation, possibly through liberalisation of
marketing and pricing policies. Conversely,
infrequent or insufficient adjustments to officially
fixed nominal prices coupled with high domestic
inflation will bring about declining real producer
prices.
12. For a discussion of the rationale and limitations of using the CPI as a deflator of producer prices, see Appendix 1.
13. In principle, it is possible to distinguish between three related kinds of price incentives to producers, viz: incentives
to encourage the substitution of work for leisure with the ultimate aim of increasing the output of a commodity;
incentives to promote the production of a domestic commodity over other competing domestic products; and
incentives to stimulate the domestic production ofa commodity in order to reduce the volume of competing imports.
The discussion in this section is limited only to the first kind of incentives since competing domestic products and
imports are not explicitly considered here. However, the incentive system in a country may encompass all three kinds.
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The estimated rates of growth ofreal domestic
producer prices in the study countries between the
early 1970s and mid-1980s are shown in Table 14.
Some caution is required in comparing results
across countries and commodities. This is because
for one of the study countries, Mali, a CPI does not
exist. Instead, the food price index (FPI) has been
used to deflate producer prices. Moreover, while
similar time periods were used for beefand mutton,
a slightly different time period was used for milk due
to the non-availability of data for one year in one of
the study countries.
Table 14. Annualpercentage growth' ofreal domestic and
border equivalent producer prices in the study
countries, 1970-86.'"
Compound annual percentage rate
of growth
1970-72 to 1984-86
Border
Product and
country
Real domestic
producer price
producer price
equivalent
Beef
in real domestic
terms
C6te d'lvoire -1.3 -3.9 ns
Mali -3.9 -5.3
Nigeria 0.2 ns -4.6
Sudan 5.8 -6.5
Zimbabwe -0.2 ns -0.7 ns
Mutton
C6te d'lvoire 3.3 -2.5
Nigeria -0.7 ns -6.7
Sudan 6.4 -1.6 ns
Cow's m il kb
Mali 2.4 ns -2.9
Sudan 1.3 ns -7.4
Zimbabwe 4.0 -1.6 ns
ns = not statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
a. The annual growth rates have been estimated as log-
linear trends by ordinary least-squares regression.
b. For milk, growth rates were estimated for the period
1971/73-1984/86.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study
countries by the author
Nonetheless, the table indicates that there
were four statistically significant cases of increases
and two statistically significant cases of decreases in
the real domestic producer prices of the
commodities surveyed. If the signs of the
non-significant coefficients are examined, the table
shows that on balance there was a general picture of
upward movement in real producer prices. The
pattern, however, varies among commodities even
within the same country. For example, in Cote
d'lvoire the producer price for beef fell, while it
increased for mutton over the same period.
Real border equivalent producer prices
(RBEPPs) were also estimated for the study
countries in order to assess the opportunities
available to producers through international trade
and to provide a basis for comparison with real
domestic producer prices.14 For each commodity,
the RBEPP was estimated by converting a world
representative price into local currency using the
official exchange rate and then deflating by the
domestic rate of inflation. The estimate thus
obtained provides an indication of the real value of
the border price in domestic terms and will vary
from one country to the other depending on the
rates of exchange and domestic inflation.
The rates of growth of real border equivalent
producer prices are shown in Table 14. In principle,
the lower the rate of inflation and/or the higher the
rate of devaluation of the exchange rate, the greater
will be the tendency for the RBEPP to rise in local
currency terms. Conversely, countries with a high
rate of inflation and a relatively constant exchange
rate, i.e. countries allowing their currencies to
become overvalued will show a rapidly declining
RBEPP. Table 14 underscores this latter point for all
the study countries. As the table shows, RBEPPs fell
in real domestic terms in all the countries studied. If
this result is taken together with the fact that the real
domestic producer price rose in some countries and
fell less rapidly than the RBEPP in others (see also
Figures 3 and 4), the implication is that the ratio of
domestic producer price to BEPP will, at least, show
a moderate increase in most of the study countries.
This point is largely confirmed as we shall see later
on in this chapter.
Price variation
At this juncture, it is useful to examine a slightly
different issue relating to the degree of price
variability in the study countries. As discussed in
14. In general, the use of border prices as the point of reference in price policy analysis does not imply that international
prices are necessarily fair or equitable, but simply that such prices are a measure of the alternatives available to a
country under free trade. Thus, they provide a guide for the use of that country's resources (Johnson, 1978). See
Appendix 1 for a discussion of the method used to derive BEPPs.
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Chapter 3, one policy objective that is frequently
mentioned by most governments is price
stabilisation. Table 15 gives an indication of how
successful the study countries have been in
minimising year-to-year variations in producer
prices. Judging by the coefficient ofvariation, except
for mutton in Cdte d'lvoire and milk in Mali, real
domestic producer prices have fluctuated less than
RBEPPs over the entire period covered. This
finding is also partly confirmed by Figures 3, 4 and
5. When the entire period covered is divided into two
subperiods, the above result remains largely
unchanged. With respect to beef in Cote d'lvoire,
Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in the period 1970-78,
the coefficient of variation in RBEPP was at least
four times as high as the coefficient of variation in
real domestic producer prices (see Appendix 2).
Further, if the variation in real domestic producer
Table 15. Variability in realdomestic andborderequivalent
producerprices, 1970-86.
Border
equivalent
Real producer price
Product and producer in real domestic
country price terms
Beef
CV CV
Cote d'lvoire 10.7 42.8
Mali 19.5 45.8
Nigeria 23.4 25.1
Sudan 39.3 67.3
Zimbabwe 11.9 48.1
Mutton
C6te d'lvoire 16.2 15.5
Nigeria 22.4 29.8
Sudan 343 36.0
Cow's milk1
Mali 34.7 23.3
Sudan 18.5 33.5
Zimbabwe 173 18.8
1. For milk, the period considered was 1971-86.
Notes: (1) CV = Coefficient of variation
(2) Nominal and real producer prices for the
products and periods covered in this table
are given in Appendix 4, Tables 1 to 12.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study.
prices is considered alone, the results indicate that
for beef in Cote d'lvoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe
and for mutton in Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria, the
variation in domestic producer prices was higher in
the period 1970-78 than it was in the period
1979-86. However, the opposite seems to be the
case for beef and milk in Mali and for beef, mutton
and milk in Sudan (see Appendix 2). For Sudan, part
of the explanation for the higher coefficient of
variation in real domestic producer prices in the
period 1979-86 (compared with 1970-78) lies in the
successive devaluations of the Sudanese pound
which started around 1979 and continued for much
of the 1980s. The devaluations which were
necessitated by structural imbalances within the
economy led to wide fluctuations in food prices,
including the prices of livestock products.
Overall, the results suggest that in comparison
with RBEPPs, a certain degree of success was
achieved in the study countries in minimising the
year-to-year fluctuations in real domestic producer
prices over the period considered. Interestingly, it
also indicates a point made earlier on in Chapter 3
about the unstable nature of world commodity
markets. It shows, for beef in particular, just how
unstable the beef industry would be in the study
countries if it were exposed to unrestricted world
prices.
IMPLICIT TAXATION (OR SUBSIDISATION)
OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS
As noted under the discussion of real producer price
trends, it appears that a certain amount ofincentive
has been provided to livestock producers through
the rise in real producer prices of some of the
commodities surveyed. Real price trends, however,
provide only a partial picture of the complex
interaction of sector and macro-economic policies
on production incentives. To provide a better
measure of the effect of price policy interventions
on production incentives, the nominal protection
coefficient (NPC) — which is defined as the ratio of
the domestic producer price to the border
equivalent price — can be used to assess both the
level of taxation against (or subsidisation of)
livestock production and the scope for increasing
incentives. By comparing domestic producer
prices to the maximum that could be offered to
producers through international trade (i.e. border
price less domestic marketing costs), the NPC
15. See Appendix 1 for the full derivation of the NPC.
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provides an indication of the taxation (or
subsidisation) rate for producers and thus, a
measure of the distortion of production
incentives.16 An NPC equal to one would indicate
that at the official exchange rate the producer is
obtaining the equivalent of the world price and, in
this sense, is neither being taxed nor subsidised. A
coefficient greater than one would suggest
subsidisation, while a coefficient of less than one
would indicate that governments are taxing
producers of the commodity in question. Given the
latter situation, there exists the scope for increasing
price incentives by raising the domestic producer
price to the same level as the border equivalent
price.
In Table 16, the estimated NPCs17 for the
producers of beef, mutton and milk are
presented.18The results indicate that, except for
beef in C6te d'lvoire, policy measures in the study
countries have implicitly subsidised livestock
producers over the period covered. When the NPCs
for beefand mutton are compared, the latter appear
higher than the former mainly as a result of higher
domestic mutton prices in the study countries.
In explaining inter-country differences in the
NPCs, it is useful to distinguish between importing
and exporting countries. For the livestock products
considered in Table 16, Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria
are net importers. In the case of milk, all the
countries considered in Panel B of the table can be
classified as net importers for most of the period
covered. In these circumstances, we would expect
the domestic price for these products to rise in
relation to the border price because ofthe increasing
need to import to meet the domestic deficit. This
indeed occurred to some extent in most of the
importing countries, with beef in Cote d'lvoire being
the only major exception. If this fact is taken
together with the decline in the real border
equivalent producer price in these countries, we
would expect the ratio of producer price to border
price to rise over time for beef, mutton and milk in
the importing countries. This expectation is largely
confirmed by the results in Table 16. Figure 6 also
Table 16. Average nominal protection coefficients for
livestock producers in the study countries,
selected periods.
Panel A. Beef and mutton
Product and
Period
country 1970-72 1977-79 1984-86
Beef
Cote
d'lvoire
0.99 2.24 0.97
Mali 1.33 2.68 1.08
Nigeria 1.52 2.59 2.27
Sudan 1.18 4.33 3.01
Zimbabwe 2.46 1.80 1.20
Mutton
C6te
d'lvoire
Nigeria
Sudan
0.97 1.64
2.35 330
2.39 3.64
Panel B. Milk
130
4.12
431
Product and
Period
country 1971-73 1977-79 1984-86
Milk
Mali 0.36 0.61 1.21
Sudan 031 0.60 132
Zimbabwe 0.58 0.81 1.04
1. NPCs were estimated using official exchange rates.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study
countries by the author.
16. While the NPC represents a simple and straight forward measure of price incentives (or disincentives), it suffers from
the disadvantage that only the product price is considered, and not the prices of inputs. More complex measures such
as the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) and Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC) which take the prices of inputs
into consideration require data on farm budgets which were not available in most of the study countries. In any case,
given the low level of purchased inputs in ruminant livestock production in the majority of the countries studied, it
is most likely that the NPC will closely approximate these other measures.
17. A major problem in estimating NPCs relates to the choice of an appropriate world market price to use as a reference
price since a number of different world price series exist. A description of the world price series used for this study
is provided in Appendix 1.
18. Since the NPCs presented in Table 16 were estimated using official exchange rates, it is to be expected that this will
lead to a significant upward bias in the NPCs of those countries with overvalued exchange rates.
19. Although the rise in the real producer price in some of the importing countries was statistically insignificant (as shown
in Table 14), the sign of the coefficients suggest an upward trend. For mutton in Nigeria, the fall in the real producer
price was small and statistically non-significant.
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shows the gradual rise in the NPCs for milk
producers in Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
In Mali, which is a livestock exporting country,
the real border equivalent producer price for beef
fell markedly between 1974 and 1975 and remained
at a depressed level until about 1981 (see Figure 3).
The real domestic producer price also fell but not as
rapidly, thus leading to a rise in the NPC over the
period covered.
In Sudan, another livestock exporting country,
the lucrative export market provided by the oil rich
Gulf states and the frequent devaluations of the
Sudanese pound from 1979 onwards indirectly led
to a rise in the real producer price of meat products.
At the same time that the real domestic producer
price was rising, the real border equivalent price was
declining. The result was a substantial rise in the
NPCs of beef and mutton over the period
considered.
With respect to Zimbabwe, a beef exporting
country, the fall in the NPC for beef, particularly
between 1984-86, was caused by a rise in the real
border equivalent price coupled with a moderate fall
in the real domestic producer price (see Figure 3).
The rise in the border price was in large part due to
Zimbabwe's realistic exchange rate policy during
this period. Although the nominal producer price
increased between 1984-86, domestic inflation
increased much faster leading to a fall in the real
producer price. The overall effect of the divergent
directions of these two prices was a decline in the
NPC for beef.
For each commodity considered above, the
underlying causes of annual changes in the NPCs
may be analysed by a simple decomposition. A
cursory glance at the equation used to derive the
NPC (see Appendix 1) will show that three variables
(the nominal producer price, the exchange rate and
the border price) determine the value of the NPC.
Following Jaeger and Humphreys (1988), the NPC
is decomposed using a difference equation which for
small changes approximates the total derivative of
the NPCs three components or sources of change
(see Appendix 3). Examining these changes in
conjunction with trends in real price changes can
help explain the underlying pattern of changing
production incentives. The NPCs for mutton and
milk in Cote d'lvoire and Mali, respectively, have
been decomposed in the above fashion and the
observed changes are explained below.
We examine first the NPC for mutton in Cote
d'lvoire which is shown in Figure 7 (Panel A). As the
graph indicates, the NPC fell below one between
1971 and 1974, but rose to 1.84 in 1979 before
falling to 1.38 in 1982. By 1986, it rose again to 1.79.
In general, there was a move away from taxation
towards subsidisation of mutton producers during
this period. The decomposed annual change in the
NPC is shown in Panel B (Figure 7). In this figure,
each set of 3 bars represents the decomposed
annual change in the NPC due to the 3 principal
components. The three, taken together, should
roughly approximate the actual change in the NPC
from the previous year (Panel A). The
decomposition indicates that in all years, with the
exception of 1984 and 1985, changes in nominal
producer prices have helped raise the NPC, with
larger magnitudes in 1976 and 1978 (see also Panel
C). Rising international prices lowered the NPC
between 1971-73 and 1979-80. Lowering of the
NPC between 1980-82 and 1983-84 was primarily
a result of nominal devaluations which have the
effect of making international prices appear higher
in domestic currency terms. At the same time that
border prices were going up, rising inflation caused
the real producer price to drop (Panel C of Figure
7), thus contributing to the fall in the NPC in those
years.
In the case of milk in Mali, the decomposition
of the NPC shows that nominal producer prices
remained unchanged between 1971-72 and
1973-75 with the result that changes in the NPC in
those years were entirely due to changes in exchange
rate and international price (Figure 8, Panel B). The
changes in the latter two variables were quite small
and consequently the changes in the NPC were
minimal. Between 1983 and 1984, a large nominal
producer price increase helped raise the NPCabove
the NPC values of the early 1970s. As Panel C
indicates, there was also an upward trend in the real
producer price around this period.
Overall, what these decompositions have
clearly shown is that the scope for governments in
the study countries to raise incentives for livestock
producers depends on a number of factors including
policies affecting the formation ofnominal producer
prices, macro-economic policies influencing the rate
of inflation and the exchange rate and international
livestock products prices. While governments can
act directly to influence the first three factors, only
indirect action may be possible in the case of
international prices. For the two Francophone
countries included in the study, the room for
manoeuvre on exchange rate management is even
limited given the fact that their currencies are tied
to the French franc.
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The Consumer Price of Livestock Products
One prime objective of governments in the study
countries is to keep the consumer price of livestock
products down in order to restrain rises in the cost
of living. The data in Table 17 indicate that, with the
exception of milk, governments have not been
entirely successful in this respect. Although there
was a statistically significant fall in the retail price of
beef in Zimbabwe, for meat products in general
there was a rise in retail prices. The rise in Sudan was
particularly high. Given the fact that in some
Table 17. Annual percentage growth of real consumer
prices in the study countries, 1970-86.
Product and country
Percentage growthrate
1970/72-1984/86
Beef
Cote dTvoire
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Mutton
Cote d'lvoire
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Milk1
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
1.9
1.4 ns
0.8 ns
7.2
-3.9
-0.3 ns
25
0.5 ns
7.7
-7.5
-4.4
4.9
-2.9
ns = not statistically significant at the 0.1 level.
The annual growth rates have been estimated as log-linear
trends by ordinary least-squares regression.
1. For milk, growth rates were estimated for the period
1972-74 to 1984-86. The milk considered here is
reconstituted milk in the case of Mali; condensed and
evaporated milk in the case of Nigeria, and fresh milk
in the case of Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study
countries by the author.
countries official rather than market prices were
used, and because meat shortages at times led to the
development of parallel markets with meat being
sold at prices higher than the official ones, the rise
in meat prices could have been higher than the
figures in Table 17 suggest. Table 18 also shows that
retail prices have not been particularly stable over
the period covered. Judging by the coefficient of
Table 18. Variability in real consumer prices in the study
countries, 1970-86.
Product and country Coefficient of
variation
Beef
C6te d'lvoire
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
Mutton
C6te d'lvoire
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Milk1
Mali
Nigeria
Sudan
Zimbabwe
9.8
16.9
20.8
35.9
23.1
12.9
18.3
12.7
36.4
36.5
35.9
28.9
11.8
1. The period considered for milk was 1972-86. The
different types of milk considered in this table are
similar to t nose in Table 17 (see note under Table 17).
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study
countries by the author.
variation, the fluctuations in retail prices almost
parallel those of producer prices. In order to
establish the extent of subsidisation (or taxation) of
consumers, NPCs were also estimated for
consumers and the results are presented in Table 19.
In the case of consumers, an NPC of less than one
implies implicit subsidisation, while a coefficient
greater than one means implicit taxation. For meat
products, the results in Table 19 show that in the
period between the early and late 1970s, there was
a gradual shift away from subsidisation to taxation
of consumers. Implicit taxation of consumers
continued till the mid-1980s in most countries, the
only exception being with regard to beef in C6te
dTvoire and Zimbabwe. This result is in agreement
with the trends in meat retail prices reported in Table
17. Throughout the period covered, milk consumers
were subsidised in Mali, but were implicitly taxed in
the remaining countries (see Figure 9). These
results thus show that in the majority of cases, the
objective of keeping retail prices down for the
benefit ofconsumers has not been fully realised. The
only caveat is that the NPCs shown here may
overstate the actual level ofconsumer taxation since
the official exchange rate was used to estimate them.
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Table 19. Average nominal protection coefficients
(NPCs) for consumers in the study countries,
selectedperiods.
Panel A. Beef and Mutton
Period
Product and country 1970-72 1977-79 1984-86
Beef
Cote d'lvoire 036 1.06 0.74
Mali 0.79 1.84 1.12
Nigeria 0.82 1.28 1.26
Sudan 031 1.06 1.40
Zimbabwe 0.98 1.18 0.59
Mutton
C6te d'lvoire 0.98 0.87 1.11
Mali 034 0.87 0.79
Nigeria 0.83 0.95 1.15
Sudan 0.80 0.95 2.02
Panel B. Milk
Period
Product and country 1972-73 1977-79 1984-86
Milk
Mali 0.78 0.72 0.59
Nigeria 1.11 2.53 3.27
Sudan 1.16 0.97 1.45
Zimbabwe 0.88 1.16 1.06
1. NPCs were estimated using the official exchange rates.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study
countries by the author.
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Figure 3. Comparison ofreal domestic and border equivalentproducerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
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Figure 4. Comparison ofreal domestic and border equivalentproducerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
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Figure 5. Comparison ofreal domestic and border equivalentproducerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1970-86.
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Figure 6. Nominalprotection coefficientsfor milkproducers in some ofthe study countries, 1971-86.
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Figure 7. Annual changes in price incentives to mutton producers in Cdte d 'Noire, 1970-86.
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Figure 8. Annual changes in price incentives to milkproducers in Mali, 1971-86.
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Figure 9. Nominalprotection coefficients (NPCs) for milk consumers in some ofthe study countries, 1972-86.
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5. REAL AND MONETARY EFFECTS OF LIVESTOCK
PRICE INTERVENTION POLICIES
One major task of policy analysis is to measure the
effects of alternative policies in ways that are useful
for decision-making. This chapter quantifies the
costs and benefits resulting from price intervention
policies in the study countries. Specifically, changes
in production and consumption brought about by
price distortions are estimated for three distinct
periods between 1970 and 1986. Changes in the
welfare of producers and consumers, as well as in
the foreign exchange bill and government revenues
are also estimated and compared with other key
economic variables. The chapter begins with a
description of the theoretical model on which the
analysis is based and then continues by detailing the
data sources. Results of the study are presented
next, followed by some concluding thoughts.
METHODOLOGY
The results presented in this chapter are derived
using the standard partial equilibrium framework
based on the Marshallian concept of economic
surplus (see Currie et al, 1971; Lutz and Scandizzo,
1980; Bale and Lutz, 1981). In this approach,
current policy interventions such as tariffs, export
taxes, quotas and subsidies are analysed in relation
to a policy without any distortions. The method
permits the estimation of the real (i.e. volume) and
monetary gains that could be obtained if the major
commodity markets in a country were fully and
simultaneously liberalised. Each commodity market
is considered separately and the estimates of gains
and losses in each market are aggregated country by
country. This single market approach implicitly
ignores linkages between commodity markets and
this represents a major limitation of the method
used here. Nonetheless, the assessment of efficiency
and welfare effects using the partial equilibrium
framework may provide reasonably good first
approximations of the order of magnitude of the
impact of distortions caused by livestock policy
interventions (see Lutz and Saadat, 1988).
Graphical representation of the partial
equilibrium model is presented in Figure 10 using
the case of an export tax as an example of a
distortionary policy. SS' represents the domestic
supply function and DD' the domestic demand
schedule. To keep the analysis simple no distinction
is made between producer and consumer price. The
export tax is P - P .. As a result of this distortion,
producers only obtain a price Pd as compared to Pw.
They produce Q. instead of Qw and incur a
producers' welfare loss of ACDH. However,
consumers benefit from the lower price; they
increase consumption from C to C. and obtain a
consumers' surplus gain of ABGH. Under this
policy, exports fall from Qw - Cw to Qd - Cd and
foreign exchange earnings for the country drop from
Pw(Qw - Cw) to Pw(Qd - Cd) while the government
obtains export tax revenues of BCEF.
This basic analytical structure of the partial
equilibrium model can also be represented by a set
of equations as shown below. The formulae allow
for differentiation between producer and consumer
prices:
Change in production,
dQi = EsidPiQi/P; (1)
Change in consumption,
dCi = EdidPjCi/Pi (2)
Net social loss in production,
NSLp = 1/2 dQidPi (3)
Net social loss in consumption,
NSLc = 1/2 dddPi (4)
Welfare gain of producers,
Gp = dPiQi - NSLp (5)
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Welfare gain of consumers,
Gc = dPiQ - NSLc (6)
Change in foreign exchange earnings,
dF = Pwi(dQi-dCi) (7)
Change in government revenue,
dRg = dPi(Qi-Di) (8)
where:
Esi = own-price supply elasticity of
commodity i,
Edi= own-price demand elasticity of
commodity i,
dPi = impact of distortion on price,
Qi= domestic production of commodity i,
Pi= domestic producer (or consumer) price
of commodity i,
Ci = domestic consumption of commodity i,
and
Pwi = border equivalent producer (or
consumer) price of commodity i.
Equations 1 and 2 measure the changes in
production and consumption as a result of a price
distortion. Equations 3 to 6 quantify the typical
efficiency and welfare changes associated with price
policy interventions. Equations 3 and 4 represent
the net efficiency losses in production and
consumption to society as a whole. In evaluating
these equations, if domestic prices move toward
border equivalent prices (i.e. a shift toward free
trade), then NSLp and NSLc are benefits (gains) to
society. If, as in the case of the imposition of an
export or import duty, the trend is away from free
trade, then the values reflect costs (losses) to society.
Equations 5 and 6 measure the welfare changes or
the extent ofmonetary gains and losses ofproducers
and consumers. They give an indication of the
"redistribution" of income, between producers and
consumers, caused by the instituted price policies.
Equation 7 measures the change in the foreign
exchange bill due to government intervention in the
pricing of the commodity in question. It is the
difference between the actual bill and what it would
have been without intervention. Equation 8 is
interpreted analogously.
The welfare gains and losses expressed in
equations 3 to 7 can be related to the corresponding
areas in Figure 10 as follows:
Eq. 3 = CDE; Eq. 4 = BFG; Eq. 5 = ACDH
(loss); Eq. 6 = ABGH;
Eq. 7 = CwCjFG + QdQwDE (loss); and Eq. 8
= BCEF.
DATA SOURCES
Apart from the summary measures ofdistortion, i.e.
the nominal protection coefficients presented in the
previous chapter, other basic parameters required
for the evaluation of welfare effects are the
elasticities of supply and demand. Although a few
studies have attempted to estimate demand and
supply elasticities for livestock products in
sub-Saharan Africa, serious methodological and
data problems tend to make the reported estimates
to be numerous and diverse (see Rodriguez, 1986
and 1987; Khalifa and Simpson, 1972; Olayide and
Oni, 1969 and 1972; Doran et al, 1979). Because
elasticity estimates can differ widely, a range of
plausible elasticities has been assumed for the
analysis reported here. The elasticity ranges
assumed were largely based on a careful review of
the empirical estimates provided in the sources cited
above and also in Braverman et al (1985) and Askari
and Cummings (1976: Table Bl, pp. 405^M)7). In all
cases, long-term supply elasticities were assumed to
range from 0.3 to 1.0 for beef, from 0.5 to 1.25 for
mutton and 0.6 to 1.50 for milk. Long-term
demand elasticities were from -0.5 to -1.05 for beef,
- 0.6 to -1.25 for mutton and -0.66 to -1.2 for milk.
The other basic data used for the calculations
are presented in Table 20 and parts of Tables 21, 22
and 23. Three periods 1970-72, 1977-79 and
1984-86 were chosen in order to show changes
resulting from price intervention policies over time.
Thus, the data and the empirical results presented
later on represent the average annual values for the
periods specified.
RESULTS
Tables 21, 22 and 23 present the gross effects of
price distortions on real variables. A summary of
gross monetary effects by country, obtained by
aggregating the estimate of gains and losses for all
the commodities considered in each country, is
20. NSLp and NSLc are, in theory, net efficiency fie. economic) losses in production and consumption, respectively.
However, the literature generally refers to them as net social losses. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion the
terminology normally used in the literature is retained here.
21. Available evidence from some of the studies cited above suggests a negative price elasticity of supply for beef in the
short run. In the long run, all studies agree that the price elasticity of supply is positive. In the analysis reported here
positive supply elasticities are used. However, it should be noted that if negative supply elasticities are assumed, the
results may be different from those reported here.
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shown in Table 24. In these base results, no attempt
has been made to correct for the effects of exchange
rate distortions. However, in order to separate the
effects of currency overvaluation from that of
specific tariffs or equivalent interventions, nominal
protection coefficients were re-estimated using
adjusted exchange rates . The recalculated NPCs
were then used to estimate the net real and
monetary effects of price distortions for the period
1984-86 only. These net estimates (i.e. net of
exchange rate distortions) are presented and
compared with gross estimates in Tables 26 and
27.
In general, the results depend on the
magnitude of the price distortions as measured by
the gross (or net) nominal protection coefficients,
the responsiveness of supply and demand as
measured by the supply and demand elasticities and
on the absolute levels of demand and supply of the
commodities in question.
As Tables 21-23 show, the gross real effects of
the price distortions are often sizeable. This is
evident in the case of beef in Zimbabwe and milk in
Mali. These two cases will be used to explain the
results reported in Table 23 for 1984-86.
The discussion in Chapter 3 and the NPCs
presented in Table 20 indicate that in the period
1984-86, the Zimbabwean government pursued
beef pricing policies that implicitly subsidised
producers and consumers. The magnitude of
impact of these price interventions on production,
consumption, human welfare and trade depends on
the elasticities of supply and demand. If we use the
low supply and demand elasticities given in Table 20,
we see that the the pricing policies pursued in
Zimbabwe, in 1984-86, which gave positive
protection to producers, increased beef output by
3400 1 (Table 23). However, the implicit subsidy to
consumers at the same time increased consumption
by 17 500 1, eventually reducing exports by 14 100 1.
The case of milk in Mali is quite similar. The
milk pricing policies pursued in 1984-86 also
implicitly subsidised both producers and consumers.
Using the low elasticities, we see that milk
production increased by 10 100 t, but consumption
also increased by 58 000 t. Thus, compared with a
situation not influenced by price distortions, imports
increased by 47 900 1. Since, in reality, total imports
during this period amounted to about 32 000 t, a
policy of non-intervention in pricing decisionswould
have made Mali more than self-sufficient in milk
production. However, the level of milk imports into
Mali due to price policy interventions was less in
1984-86 than in 1972-73 (47 900 1 vs 103 100 1; see
Table 21). This suggests some improvement in milk
pricing policies between the two periods considered
here.
With respect to the gross monetary effects of
price distortions, the total net social losses in
production (i.e. losses in production efficiency that
society as a whole has to bear) aggregated for the
commodities studied in each country, ranged from
US$ 0.3 million for Zimbabwe to US$ 141.5 million
for Nigeria in 1984-86, using the low elasticity
assumption (Table 24, panel A, column 2). The total
net social losses in consumption (i.e. economic
losses that society has to bear due to consumption
changes caused by price intervention) ranged from
US$ 5.8 million in Zimbabwe to about US$ 660
million in Nigeria (Table 24, panel A, column 3).
Compared to the efficiency-type losses, the
welfare-type gains (losses) for producers and
consumers were larger. For example, using the low
elasticity assumption, the welfare gains to producers
in 1984-86 were from seven times (C6te dTvoire,
Nigeria and Sudan) to 40 times (Zimbabwe) as large
as the net social losses in production during thesame
period (compare columns 2 and 4 in panel A, Table
24). On the face of it, this suggests a gradual shift
away from discrimination against producers. On the
other hand, consumers appeared to have gained
even more than producers from pricing policy
interventions in Cote dTvoire, Mali and Zimbabwe
during the same period (compare Columns 4 and 5
in Table 24). In these three countries, foreign
exchange earnings appeared to have been negatively
affected by the particular policies pursued. For most
of the period covered, Nigeria and Sudan obtained
net revenues from the interventions, whereas the
policies of the other three countries were such that
the government incurred a deficit. This implies that
taxes, if any, were more than fully offset by
subsidies.
Aggregating the gross monetary effects of
intervention conceals one important point: that for
commodities with negative protection (e.g. beef in
Cote dTvoire in 1984-86), the (monetary) welfare
losses to producers will always be much larger than
22. The adjusted exchange rates are meant to correct for distortions in the official exchange rates. In each case, the extent
of overvaluation of the official exchange rate was estimated using the differential inflation rate between domestic
prices (approximated by the consumer price index) and foreign prices (based on the consumer price index of the
United States of America). The base period for the adjustment reported here was 1970.
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the efficiency losses. Thus, on both welfare(i.e.
equity) and efficiency grounds, there are cogent
reasons in advocating for a move away from
negative protection of livestock commodities.
Comparison of the gross monetary effects of
price distortions with some key economic indicators
(Table 25) shows that producers' monetary gains in
relation to agricultural GDP vary from 0.1% in Cdte
d'lvoire to 17.4% in Sudan in 1984-86. The changes
in government revenues due to pricing policy
interventions compared to official development
assistance (ODA) were relatively small for those
countries which receive large foreign aid flows (e.g.
Sudan and Mali) and very large for Nigeria which
obtains little aid. The changes in foreign exchange
earnings in relation to ODA were quite large for all
the countries studied. The above comparisons and
the ratios obtained appear to justify continued
attention to pricing policies, along with other
macro-economic policies, in order to ensure a more
efficient incentive system for livestock production in
the study countries.
Thus far, the analysis has been conducted
without adjusting for exchange rate distortions.
However, it is widely known that for part of the
period covered in this study, governments in all the
study countries intervened in the foreign exchange
markets either directly, through exchange rate
restrictions (as in Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe),
or indirectly through import tariffs and licences (as
in COte d'lvoire, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and
Zimbabwe), with the result that their currencies
were typically overvalued. Currency overvaluation
acts like a tax on exports and like a subsidy on
imports. These distortions are in addition to those
created by direct pricing policy instruments such as
import duties and export taxes. Therefore, as
previously explained, an attempt was made to
correct for exchange rate distortions by using
adjusted exchange rates (instead of official exchange
rates) to convert border prices into domestic
currencies. The adjusted exchange rate as estimated
here is the official exchange rate in a base year
adjusted by the ratio of domestic to international
rates of inflation (see footnote 22, page 41). The
estimated adjusted exchange rates are presented
together with the official exchange rates in Table 28
of Appendix 4.
Based on the adjustments and relative to the
base year (1970), it appeared that the official
exchange rate in all the study countries, except
Zimbabwe, was overvalued in 1984-86. By contrast,
the official exchange rate was undervalued in
Zimbabwe during the same period.
In principle, if the official exchange rate is
overvalued (undervalued), the use of an adjusted
exchange rate in computing NPCs would make the
latter smaller (higher) in absolute terms. Thus, ifwe
consider the NPC for a producer, the use of an
adjusted exchange rate in place of an overvalued
exchange rate would reveal a larger negative
distortion against commodities with initial negative
protection or a reduced positive distortion for goods
with initial positive rates of protection. The
magnitude of the changes in NPCswould depend on
the degree of currency overvaluation. The results
obtained by using revised NPCs, based on adjusted
exchange rates, are presented in Tables 26 and 27
where they are also compared with the results
obtained using official exchange rates.
Before looking at the results, a few comments
are in order at this point. First, the method used to
adjust the exchange rates assumes that they were in
equilibrium (i.e. neither over- or undervalued) in
the base year, 1970. Ifthis assumption does not hold,
the adjusted exchange rates will not fully reflect the
extent of distortions in official exchange rates, but
will still give an indication of the level of distortions
relative to whatever the situation was in the base
year. Second, in theory, the adjustment ofexchange
rates should also have significant impact on
domestic prices and, possibly, on the elasticities of
demand and supply of the commodities under
consideration. However, these other effects were
not considered in the analysis reported here.
Despite this limitation, the results obtained are quite
interesting.
In Table 26, the gross estimates were obtained
by using NPCs calculated with official exchange
rates, while the net estimates were derived by using
revised NPCs based on adjusted exchange rates. A
comparison of the gross and net volume figures
indicates that, for those countries with overvalued
exchange rates in 1984-86 (e.g. Mali, Nigeria, Sudan
and Cdte d'lvoire), there would be greater
reductions in exports and/or greater increases in
imports if adjusted (i.e. undistorted) exchange rates
were used in the analysis in place of the official
exchange rates. Thus for a beef exporting country
like Sudan, Table 26 shows that exports of beef
would be 19 200 tonnes lower if NPCs based on
adjusted exchange rates were used. Similarly, for a
23. Relevant figures in Table 20 can be used to solve the equations specified earlier in this chapter to verify this assertion.
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beef importing country like Cote d'lvoire, imports
of beef would be 1400 1 higher.
Although these results may appear
counter-intuitive at first, they are entirely consistent
with the estimated NPCs and the pattern of
overvaluation of currencies in the study countries
between 1984 and 1986. The results obtained for
beef in Cote d'lvoire can be used to throw more light
on the data shown in Table 26.
The NPCs estimated for beef producers, using
the official exchange rate, showed a negative
protection for beef production in Cote d'lvoire
between 1984 and 1986. As explained above, the use
of an adjusted exchange rate in place of the official,
overvalued, exchange rate would reveal a larger
negative protection for beef. The net effect would
be a reduction in production, as shown in Table 26.
At the same time, beef consumers were being
implicitly subsidised. However, the use of an
overvalued exchange rate masks the magnitude of
the implicit subsidy to consumers. The use of an
adjusted exchange rate reveals that the subsidy, and
hence the consumption that it engenders, is much
higher. Since the change in imports is obtained as
the difference between the change in production
and consumption, the net effect is a higher level of
imports. The reduction in beef exports for a country
such as Sudan can be explained similarly. The
estimates in Table 26 thus indicate the kind of
masked distortions (or wrong market signals) that
an overvalued exchange rate can create.
With respect to the net monetary effects (Table
27), the use of revised NPCs further exposes the
hidden distortionary effect of overvalued exchange
rates for producers, consumers and governments
alike. Mali and Nigeria represent two prime
examples of how an overpriced exchange rate
adversely affects producers and governments, while
benefiting consumers. For Mali, a comparison ofthe
gross and net monetary estimates show that for the
period 1984-86 producer welfare effects switched
from being positive to negative (i.e. producers
suffered monetary losses), losses in foreign
exchange earnings were three times higher, while
the increase in benefits to consumers was about
twice as high as in the base case. At the same time
in Nigeria, welfare gains to producers and
government revenues became significantly reduced,
foreign exchange earnings switched from being
positive to negative, while consumer welfare losses
became substantially reduced compared to the base
case.
Overall, what these results suggest is that, for
example, in a country with average NPCs for
producers of 0.7 and an exchange rate which is
overvalued by 25%, a narrow focus on removing
direct price distortions will be inadequate. The
imbalances that cause exchange rate distortions will
need to be addressed at the same time that reforms
of direct livestock pricing policy are being pursued.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has tried to examine the objectives and
instruments of livestock pricing policies in a selected
sample of SSA countries. A major objective of the
study has been to provide a cross-country
comparison ofthe effects oflivestock pricing policies
on production incentives, producers' and
consumers' welfare and government revenues.
Based on the findings of this study, it appears that
since the early 1980s there has been a reduction in
the level of price discrimination against livestock
producers in the study countries. This reduction in
taxation has come about through the institution of
a variety of direct and indirect policy measures and
represents an improvement over the situation in the
1970s.
However, there still exists scope for improving
price incentives in the study countries. Ordinarily,
some of the measures already instituted such as
liberalisation of agricultural marketing and currency
devaluation should help raise real price incentives.
But these measures will have the desired effect only
to the extent that they are not offset by increased
domestic inflation. Ifgovernments are able, through
appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, to reduce
inflation, this can serve to support and strengthen
the other more direct measures aimed at improving
real price incentives. This implies that
macro-economic policies and specific sectoral
measures designed to raise price incentives need to
be closely co-ordinated if they are to provide
maximum benefit to livestock producers.
While the focus of this study has been entirely
on the effect of livestock pricing policies on output,
it is fair to acknowledge that there are also structural
impediments to increased livestock production in
sub-Saharan Africa. These include climatic and
disease problems, inadequate infrastructure and
research and extension services. Lack ofattention to
these other factors will weaken whatever
improvement is achieved in the area of pricing
policy. Thus, simultaneously with pricing reforms,
investment in research and infrastructure will have
to be made in order to achieve sustainable livestock
production in the study countries and elsewhere in
sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 10. Effects ofexport tax or equivalent intervention.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1
PRICE DATA SOURCES, LIMITATIONS AND ESTIMATION METHODS
DATA SOURCES
The time-series data on official and market prices
that were used for the analysis presented in Chapter
4 were collected from the study countries during
1988. Each study country, apart from Ethiopia, was
visited for two weeks to confer with policy makers
and scientists familiar with the livestock subsector
and to obtain copies of existing documents and
studies relating to the sector. These documents,
amongst other things, provided the data used in
estimating transport and processing costs in those
instances where these costs were not directly
provided by marketing agencies of the study
countries. The data collected during field visits were
also supplemented with published statistics on world
prices, sea freight rates, exchange rates and
consumer price indices from a variety of sources
including the FAO Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
ILO (1981 and 1988), IMF (1987) and World Bank
(1986b).
DATA LIMITATIONS
Although attempts were made to improve upon the
data used for the analysis, there are still various
limitations in them. In the first instance, the
producer price series available in some countries
refer to intermediate market (i.e. market between
rural and urban centres), rather than farm-gate
prices. In such cases, various deductions may be
required to arrive at actual farm-gate prices. These
deductions relating to transport and marketing
charges were made in those instances where there
was sufficient information to do so. However, in
other cases, rather than make deductions on the
basis of inadequate information, no attempt was
made to adjust the intermediate market prices.
Secondly, the consumer prices used for the
analysis refer to retail prices in the capital cities.
Rural retail prices have been largely ignored and in
any case were mostly unavailable. In some cases,
official retail prices were used where actual market
prices were unavailable. The use of official retail
prices may, however, give a misleading picture as to
the actual changes in the market prices of the
products considered. Overall, these limitations call
for caution in interpreting the results reported in the
study.
BORDER EQUIVALENT PRICES
Border equivalent prices, or world prices adjusted
for transport, marketing and processing costs, were
estimated to serve as yardsticks and to indicate the
extent to which domestic prices have been distorted
by government intervention. For an imported
commodity, the border price was computed by
taking the appropriate international price and
adding sea freight and insurance charges to obtain
the c.i.f. price which was then converted into local
currency at the official exchange rate. To this price,
handling, transport and marketing charges from the
border to the domestic market were added to arrive
at the equivalent market price for the imported
commodity.
From the latter, transport, processing and
marketing charges from the farm to the marketwere
deducted to obtain the border equivalent producer
price at the farm gate. Algebraically, the border
equivalent producer price at the farm gate for an
imported commodity is thus:
Pb = (Pw + Tw) + Td-Cd
where:
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 Pb is the border equivalent producer price at
the farm gate;
P is the world price;
T represents ocean freight and insurance
charges;
(P + T ) represents the c.i.f. price which was
converted to local currency at the official
exchange rate;
Td represents handling, transport and
marketing charges from port to the domestic
market;
C. represents transport, processing and
marketing charges from farm gate to domestic
market.
For an export commodity, the border
equivalent producer price at the farm gate was
derived in a slightly different way. In this case, ocean
freight and insurance charges were deducted from
the world price to give the f.o.b. border price. From
the latter, transport, processing and marketing
charges from the farm to the domestic market were
deducted and the value of by-products added to
arrive at the border equivalent producer price. In
symbols:
P.=Pb « Td-Cd + Vb
where:
V. is the value of by-products.
In all cases, the reference market was assumed
to be the largest city — usually the capital city.
However, the case of Mali deserves special
mention. Although Mali was classified as an
exporter, the border equivalent price for Malian
producers was not estimated as explained above.
The land-locked nature of the country and the fact
that Mali's traditional export market had always
been COte d'lvoire necessitated a different
approach. Thus, for beef and mutton in Mali, the
border equivalent price was estimated by using c.i.f.
price in Abidjan port rather than Pw as the starting
point of the analysis — the assumption being that
Abidjan is the place where beef from Mali will have
to compete with imported beef.
Also at this point, it is worthwhile to briefly
examine the world market prices used in this study
as reference prices. Due to the existence of a
number of widely differing world price series for
livestock products, it is difficult to find a single price
series that will be adequate for all purposes, i.e. that
will take into account the specificity of meat grades
as well as the diversity that exists between different
types of exporters on the one hand and between
importers and exporters on the other. Nevertheless,
to provide a common basis for comparison between
countries, for each product considered in the study
(e.g. beef) the same world price was used for all the
study countries. This approach suffers from the
shortcoming of not properly accounting for the
regional trade flows among neighbouring countries
(this was taken into consideration in the case ofMali
as discussed above), but the approach is justified in
the sense that it provides a common basis for
comparison among all the study countries and
better reflects the extent of distortion of domestic
prices.
Thus for beef, Argentinian f.o.b. prices for
frozen boneless beef were used. These were
converted into carcass weight equivalent prices for
the estimation ofborder equivalent producer prices.
For mutton, London wholesale prices for New
Zealand frozen whole carcass were used. Both
prices were taken from the IMF Financial Statistical
Yearbook. The world price for reconstituted milk
was obtained as a composite of the prices of skim
milk powder and butteroil. Both prices were taken
from various issues of the FAO Commodity Review
and Food Outlook.
THE ESTIMATION OF REAL PRICES
Throughout Chapter 4, real prices have been
computed by using the consumer price index (CPI)
to deflate actual producer and consumer prices. The
CPI was used as a deflator of nominal producer
prices in order to estimate the producers' real
purchasing power and its incentive (or disincentive)
effect on livestock production. For the same set of
prices the producer price index (PPI) could have
been used, instead of the CPI, to give an idea of the
net return to livestock production vis-a-vis other
agricultural production activities. However, the CPI
was the only readily available and most consistent
price series in all the countries studied. The analysis
was.therefore, confined to the use of the CPI alone.
The CPI published in the IMF International
Financial Statistics Yearbook was used for each
country, except Mali. In the case of Mali, a CPI did
not exist prior to 1988. The ILO Yearbook of
Labour Statistics, however, contains a food price
index (FPI) for Mali and this was used to deflate
nominal prices in that country.
Real border prices were computed by deflating
nominal border prices (obtained as explained
above) by the CPI or the FPI in the Malian case.
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THE NOMINAL PROTECTION NPC = P ./P.
COEFFICIENT where:
The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) Pd is the domestic producer price; and
measures the extent to which domestic prices Pb is the border equivalent producer price
diverge from border equivalent prices. For producer computed as explained above,
prices, it was estimated as follows:
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Product and
country
APPENDIX 2
VARIABILITY IN REAL DOMESTIC AND BORDER
EQUIVALENT PRODUCER PRICES
Real domestic
producer price
Border
equivalent
producer price
in real domestic
terms
Product and
country
Real domestic
producer price
Border
equivalent
producer price
in real domestic
terms
Panel A: 1970-1978
CV cv
Panel B: 1979-1986
CV
CV = Coefficient of variation.
1. For milk, the period considered was 1971-78.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries.
CV
Beer Beef
Cdte d'lvoire 10.1 49.2 Cdte d'lvoire 7.8 28.6
Mali 11.2 47.8 Mali 16.3 32.1
Nigeria 28.5 22.8 Nigeria 17.2 19.7
Sudan 9.5 71.4 Sudan 35.2 14.8
Zimbabwe 13.1 53.8 Zimbabwe 11.2 43.8
Mutton Mutton
Cdte d'lvoire 18.9 14.4 C6te d'lvoire 4.2 10.8
Nigeria 23.8 17.1 Nigeria 18.9 25.2
Sudan 9.5 43.4 Sudan 26.3 24.4
Cow milk1 Cow milk
Mali 9.9 26.7 Mali 38.3 7.8
Sudan 13.1 20.1 Sudan 22.7 21.1
Zimbabwe 5.5 24.3 Zimbabwe 12.2 10.3
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APPENDIX 3
DECOMPOSITION OF THE NPC
The annual change in the nominal protection
coefficient (NPC) can be decomposed into its
component parts using a difference equation
(Jaeger and Humphreys, 1988). Ifwe start with the
basic NPC equation, i.e.
NPC, = Ptd/(EtPtw),
where P is the domestic producer price for a
given commodity,
E( is the official exchange rate, and P* is the
border equivalent price for the commodity, all for
period t. The total derivative for the above is :
dNPC = (l/EPw)dPd - (Pd/(E2Pw))dE -
(Pd/(EPw2))dPw,
which for small changes is approximated with
first differences by:
NPC,+1 - NPC, = (Pd,+1 - P,d) /(E,P,W)
-(Et+1-Et)P,d/(PtV
"(pW,+i-p.W)P.d/(E,P,W2)
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APPENDIX 4
TABLES ON NOMINAL AND REAL PRODUCER, CONSUMER AND
BORDER EQUIVALENT PRICES IN FIVE OF
THE STUDY COUNTRIES, 1970-86
Table 1. Nominalproducerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire1 Mali2 Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
FCFA/kg cw FCFA/kg cw Naira/kg cw Pound/kg cw Cents/kg cw
1970 146 155 0.52 0.09 35.66
1971 156 176 0.57 0.12 36.76
1972 177 201 0.63 0.12 40.38
1973 198 229 0.82 0.14 49.35
1974 219 254 1.05 0.15 56.82
1975 271 288 1.86 0.24 58.96
1976 332 291 2.30 0.25 57.00
1977 338 328 2.82 0.24 57.91
1978 417 348 2.86 0.32 57.26
1979 433 407 3.30 0.87 70.46
1980 520 473 3.30 0.90 81.11
1681 558 456 3.78 1.00 102.08
1982 594 483 3.95 1.18 129.19
1983 604 509 4.68 1.67 130.42
1984 520 444 5.31 1.46 147.98
1985 604 486 5.36 1.66 153.30
1986 667 658 8.82 6.57 179.83
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: 1. CSte d'lvoire/Republique Franchise (1983); Cdte d'lvoire/FAO (1984).
2. Office Malien du Betail et de la viande(OMBEVI), Statistiques du bitail et de la viande (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD)
(unpublished data).
4. Sudan Gov't (1985); LMMC (Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, Sudan) (unpublished data).
5. AMA (1980; 1986).
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 Table 2. Railproducerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire1 Mali2 Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
FCFA/kg cw FCFAAp cw Naira/kg cw Pound/kg cw Cents/kg cw
1970 452.15 591.66 2.18 0.43 73.68
1971 490.57 558.97 2.06 035 73.67
1972 554.69 591.70 2.22 030 78.71
1973 558.69 521.87 2.73 0.49 93.29
1974 526.57 567.22 3.11 0.44 100.74
1975 584.68 606.95 4.12 035 94.94
1976 639.08 568.17 4.18 036 82.73
1977 510.73 511.70 4.22 0.48 76.20
1978 55736 407.49 331 033 7131
1979 496.50 496.95 3.63 1.09 74.25
1980 520.00 473.00 3.30 0.90 81.11
1981 512.73 406.60 3.13 0.80 90.18
1982 50832 42031 3.04 0.75 103.19
1983 488.36 403.89 2.92 0.81 84.63
1984 403.13 312.68 2.37 033 79.90
1985 459.77 316.62 2.27 0.42 76.31
1986 47605 448.84 3.70 1.34 78.29
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the table
are in terms of 1980 values,
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. C6te d'lvoire/Rcpublique Franchise (1983); C6te d'lvoire /FAO (1984).
2. Office Malien du be'tail et de la viande (OMBEVI), Statistiques du Mail etdela viande. (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD) (unpublished data).
4. Sudan (1985) and Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation (unpublished data).
5. AMA(1980; 1986).
Table 3. Border equivalentproducerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year Cote d'lvoire Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
FCFA/kg cw FCFA/kg cw Naira/kg cw Pound/kg cw Cents/kg cw
1970 131.27 103.88 0.31 0.06 1031
1971 164.68 135.96 0.38 0.09 15.97
1972 194.74 165.21 0.46 0.14 23.84
1973 243.13 208.47 0.70 0.21 37.31
1974 319.05 280.38 0.76 0.23 48.31
1975 11139 91.64 0.75 0.05 12.75
1976 134.95 111.46 0.88 0.06 1734
1977 17236 137.42 1.03 0.06 26.82
1978 14137 112.09 1.06 0.08 30.71
1979 236.66 159.27 1.40 0.17 51.03
1980 242.38 151.80 1.39 0.20 40.76
1981 273.45 173.84 1.40 0.23 42.72
1982 39038 285.17 1.66 0.29 34.78
1983 45936 346.78 1.84 0.43 4437
1984 623.92 503.14 2.18 0.68 85.92
1985 665.94 540.27 2.45 0.79 174.22
1986 57634 447.64 4.05 1.38 180.71
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
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Table 4. Real border equivalentproducerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
FCFA/kpcw FCF/Vkg cw Naira/kg cw Pound/kf cw Cents/kg cw
1970 406.53 397.55 1.29 0.29 21.71
1971 517.86 431.07 1.38 0.44 32.00
1972 610.28 486.34 1.62 0.59 46.47
1973 686.03 474.87 2.34 0.75 70.53
1974 767.13 625.71 2.24 0.65 85.66
1975 240.76 193.13 1.66 0.11 20.53
1976 259.77 217.40 1.59 0.13 25.46
1977 260.74 214.38 1.55 0.12 35.29
1978 189.29 131.25 1.31 0.14 38.24
1979 271.37 194.47 134 0.21 53.77
1980 242.38 151.80 1.40 0.20 40.76
1981 251.26 154.94 1.16 0.19 37.74
1982 334.20 248.41 1.28 0.19 27.78
1983 37137 275.00 1.15 0.21 28.92
1984 483.70 354.32 0.97 0.25 46.39
1985 506.92 352.20 1.04 0.20 86.72
1986 411.49 305.35 1.70 0.28 78.67
Notes: 1. Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
2. The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as the base year,
thus all prices in the table are in terms of 1980 values,
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
Table 5. Nominalproducerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg cw
Nigeria
Naira/kg cw
Sudan
Pound/kg cw
1970 200
1971 230
1972 244
1973 260
1974 280
1975 305
1976 480
1977 600
1978 800
1979 900
1980 1000
1981 1050
1982 1100
1983 1200
1984 1200
1985 1200
1986 1300
cw = icarcass weight.
1.05
1.16
1.28
1.15
1.94
2.93
4.03
4.67
5.20
5.36
5.36
5.25
5.64
8.77
8.88
8.36
14.19
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.38
0.35
0.41
0.58
1.19
1.46
1.67
2.01
3.34
2.83
3.73
10.49
Sources: 1. Cdte d'lvoire /Republique Franchise (1983); C6te d'lvoirc/FAO (1987).
2. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD) (unpublished data).
3. Sudan Gov't (1985); LMMC (Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation) (unpublished data).
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Table 6. Realproducerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
J986.
C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kgcw
619.39
723.27
764.65
733.63
673.24
658.04
923.96
906.62
1069.66
1031.99
1000.00
964.81
941.70
970.25
930.30
913.45
927.84
Nigeria
Naira/kg cw
4.41
4.20
431
3.83
5.74
6.49
7.32
6.98
6.39
5.89
5.36
4.35
4.33
5.47
3.97
334
5.95
Sudan
Pound/kg cw
0.84
0.94
0.91
0.85
0.69
059
050
051
0.95
1.49
1.46
134
1.29
1.63
1.03
0.93
_2J3_
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the table
are in terms of 1980 values,
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. C6te d'lvoire/Republique Franchise (1983); C6te d'lvoire/FAO (1987).
2. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD) (unpublished data).
3. Sudan Gov't (1985) and LMMC (Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation) (unpublished data).
Table 7. Border equivalentproducerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates,
cw = carcass weight.
Sources: World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
Cote d'lvoire Nigeria Sudan
FCFAAgcw Naira/kg cw Pound/kg cw
204.22 0.43 0.06
22334 0.47 0.07
271.66 039 0.14
320.84 0.86 0.20
361.79 0.82 0.14
321.49 1.05 0.10
382.26 1.12 0.12
418.26 1.25 0.11
488.18 136 0.24
488.35 137 0.25
58137 1.70 0.48
74335 1.86 037
791.39 1.78 0.64
74534 1.78 0.76
89434 1.93 039
884.28 2.19 1.09
723.49 338 1.96
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Table 8. Real border equivalentproducerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg cw
Nigeria
Naira/kg cw
Sudan
Pound/kg cw
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1685
1986
632.46
702.96
851.33
905.30
869.90
693.61
735.82
632.00
652.73
559.97
581.57
683.22
677.50
602.80
693.50
673.12
516.37
1.82
1.70
2.09
2.85
2.41
2.32
2.03
1.86
1.92
1.73
1.70
1.54
1.37
1.11
0.86
0.93
1.50
0.29
0.35
038
0.72
0.40
0.24
0.28
0.21
0.40
0.32
0.48
0.30
0.41
0.37
0.22
0.27
0.40
Notes: 1. Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
2. The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices
in the table are in terms of 1680 values.
3. cw = carcass weight.
Sources: World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
Table 9. Nominalproducerprices for milk in the study countries, 1971-86.
Year Mali'
FCFA/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cent/kg
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1684
1985
1986
24.27
24.27
36.41
36.41
36.41
43.69
43.69
54.37
63.11
63.11
72.82
108.01
101.94
201.94
231.07
231.07
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.58
0.58
0.87
1.07
6.58
6.71
7.18
7.31
8.72
10.33
10.16
10.16
12.96
15.54
2035
25.22
30.38
33.43
38.12
40.96
Sources: 1. Union laitiere de Bamako, Mali (unpublished data).
2. Animal Production Corp. and Kuku Dairy Production Cooperative, Sudan (unpublished data).
3. AMA (1980; 1986).
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 Table 10. Realproducerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1971-86.
Year Mali1
FCFA/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe "
Cent/kg
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
76.95
71.44
82.94
81.25
76.73
85.22
68.16
63.66
77.06
63.11
64.90
94.08
80.84
142.21
150.63
157.62
0.23
0.20
0.22
0.17
0.24
0.23
0.20
0.17
0.13
0.29
0.23
0.19
0.28
0.21
0.22
0.22
13.19
13.08
13.57
12.96
14.04
14.99
13.37
12.65
13.66
15.54
18.15
20.14
19.71
18.05
18.97
17.83
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the table
are in terms of 1980 values.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. Union laitiere de Bamako, Mali (unpublished data).
2. Animal Production Corp. and Kuku Dairy Production Cooperative, Sudan (unpublished data).
3. AMA (1980; 1986).
Table 11. Border equivalent producerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1971-86.
Year Mali
FCFA/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
63.63
71.29
79.20
90.40
77.02
65.17
75.31
83.42
104.33
131.63
153.33
162.52
177.44
194.85
197.27
160.71
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.15
0.16
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.20
0.27
0.30
0.39
0.47
0.47
0.68
0.75
10.48
12.74
13.20
15.19
13.85
10.15
11.03
12.63
18.13
23.05
23.48
23.47
28.77
31.99
38.14
38.55
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
Sources: FAO (1982); FAO food outlook (various issues); World Bank(1986b), and data collected from the study
countries.
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Table 12. Real border equivalentproducerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1971-86.
Year Mali
FCFA/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
201.74
209.86
180.41
201.74
162.32
127.11
117.49
97.68
127.39
131.63
136.66
14137
140.71
137.22
128.60
109.62
0.40
0.44
0.45
0.42
0.37
0.30
0.29
0.26
0.25
0.27
0.24
0.15
0.23
0.17
0.17
0.15
21.00
24.83
24.95
26.93
22.30
14.73
14.51
15.73
19.10
23.05
20.74
18.75
18.67
17.27
18.98
16.78
Note: 1. Border prices have been converted at officialexchange rates.
2. The consumerprice indices used to deflate nominal border prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices
in the table are in terms of 1980 values.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); FAO (1982); FAOfood outlook (various issues); World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data
collected from the study countries.
Table 13. Nominal consumerprices for beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg
Mali2
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1970 177 138 0.66 0.17 44.00
1971 178 138 0.71 0.17 44.00
1972 190 138 0.75 0.17 44.00
1973 215 138 0.74 0.26 65.00
1974 247 150 1.18 0.30 73.00
1975 307 300 2.03 0.50 79.00
1976 345 300 2.76 0.46 87.00
1977 441 315 2.84 0.59 90.00
1978 539 400 3.14 0.30 95.00
1979 550 425 3.58 1.26 80.00
1980 650 500 3.76 1.66 86.00
1981 800 550 3.97 2.28 114.00
1982 900 575 4.71 251 114.00
1983 900 600 5.61 3.60 125.00
1984 900 600 6.70 4.17 125.00
1985 950 650 6.60 5.29 132.00
1986 950 687 9.50 10.08 151.00
Sources: 1. C6te d'lvoire /Republique Franchise (1983) and Socicte pour 1c devcloppcment des productions animalcs
(unpublished data).
2. Office Malien du betail et dc la viande, Statistiques du bitail et de la viande (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD) (unpublished data).
4. Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, Sudan (unpublished data).
5. Agricultural Marketing Authority, Zimbabwe (unpublished data).
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Table 14. Real consumerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire1
FCFA/kg
Mali2
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1970 548.16 526.21 2.77 0.82 90.91
1971 559.75 435.95 2.57 0.81 88.18
1972 595.42 404.77 2.64 0.71 85.77
1973 606.66 313.21 2.47 0.95 122.87
1974 593.89 334.75 3.49 0.87 129.43
1975 662.35 632.24 4.50 1.17 127.21
1976 664.10 585.14 5.01 1.06 126.27
1977 666.36 507.02 4.25 1.16 118.42
1978 720.68 468.38 3.86 0.49 118.31
1979 630.66 518.93 3.94 1.58 84.30
1980 650.00 500.00 3.76 1.66 86.00
1981 735.09 490.20 3.29 1.83 100.71
1982 770.48 500.87 3.62 1.64 91.05
1983 727.68 475.81 3.50 1.76 81.12
1984 697.73 422.53 2.99 1.52 67.49
1985 723.15 423.73 2.79 133 65.70
1986 678.04 468.62 3.98 2.05 65.74
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the table
are in terms of 1980 values.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. C6te d'lvoire /Republique Franchise (1983) and Society pour le developpement des productions
animales (unpublished data).
2. Office malien du bctail et de la viande, Statistiques du bitail et de la viande (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (FLD) (unpublished data).
4. Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, Sudan (unpublished data).
5. Agricultural Marketing Authority, Zimbabwe (unpublished data).
Table 15. Border equivalent consumerpricesfor beefin the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
FCFA/kg FCFA/kg Naira/kg Pound/kg Cents/kg
1970 281.92 137.02 0.73 0.28 36.11
1971 327.42 181.43 0.86 0.33 45.99
1972 371.00 225.93 0.99 0.42 57.69
1973 451.78 273.03 1.33 035 79.61
1974 575.82 341.01 1.60 0.65 97.39
1975 29534 117.47 139 0.36 44.08
1976 344.77 139.00 1.97 0.38 51.97
1977 442.83 191.66 2.21 0.48 65.69
1978 427.22 183.87 2.33 033 70.94
1979 602.24 259.60 2.95 0.92 9631
1980 650.95 275.13 2.99 1.16 97.10
1981 715.36 268.87 3.04 1.09 97.98
1982 902.15 381.01 3.62 1.88 93.80
1983 1017.69 447.65 4.11 232 11837
1984 125337 580.21 4.88 2.79 173.18
1985 1314.83 609.92 5.21 4.81 242.11
1986 1225.35 541.93 8.23 6.26 308.96
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
Sources: World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
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Table 16. Nominal consumerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg
Mair
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1682
1683
1684
1685
1986
275
300
360
360
360
400
400
500
600
650
700
900
1100
1100
1300
1300
1350
150 0.65 0.29
150 0.70 0.29
150 0.74 0.29
150 0.75 038
250 0.68 0.41
325 1.63 0.70
375 2.00 0.63
425 239 0.79
500 235 0.43
600 2.91 1.74
700 3.17 2.75
750 3.49 3.33
775 3.97 4.03
800 5.08 5.67
755 5.65 6.57
785 639 8.34
940 8.11 14.73
Sources: 1. C6te d'lvoire /Republique Francaise (1983); Socie'te' pour le developpement des productions animates,
C6te d'lvoire (unpublished data).
2. Office malien du betail et de la viande: Statistiques du bitail et de la viande (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (unpublished data).
4. Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, Sudan (unpublished data).
Table 17. Real consumerpricesfor mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg
Mali
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
iro
1971
1972
1973
1974
19-5
1976
1977
1978
1979
1680
1681
1982
1983
1684
1985
1986
851.66 574.05 2.73 1.40
943.40 475.59 233 1.38
1128.17 441.57 2.61 1.22
1015.80 341.69 230 1.39
865.59 557.91 2.90 1.18
863.00 684.93 3.61 1.63
769.97 731.42 3.63 1.44
755.51 663.03 337 135
802.25 585.48 3.13 0.71
745.33 732.60 3.20 2.18
700.00 700.00 3.17 2.75
826.98 668.45 2.89 2.67
941.70 675.09 3.05 2.57
889.39 634.42 3.17 2.77
1007.83 531.69 232 2.40
989.57 511.73 2.79 2.09
963.53 641.20 3.40 2.99
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate actual prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the table
are in terms of 1980 values.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. C6te d'lvoire/Republique Francaise (1983); Socie'te' pour le developpement des productions animales,
COte d'lvoire (unpublished data).
2. Office Malien du betail et de la viande' Statistiques du Mail et de la viande (various issues).
3. Nigerian Livestock Information Service and Federal Livestock Department (unpublished data).
4. Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, Sudan (unpublished data).
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 Table 18. Border equivalent consumerprices for mutton in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire
FCFA/kg
Mali
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
290.45
308.47
356.89
41530
472.86
445.30
521.01
595.04
687.95
721.29
848.68
1034.23
1103.39
1075.89
1239.09
1235.17
1097.72
241.23 0.76 0.32
271.57 0.82 0.34
324.48 0.96 0.44
391.82 1.23 034
431.71 1.31 038
394.44 1.86 0.65
460.21 2.12 0.68
515.16 2.44 0.76
62331 2.84 1.02
610.92 3.02 1.27
734.25 3.28 1.75
916.43 3.60 1.86
965.72 3.76 2.69
939.20 4.32 3.03
1117.41 4.76 3.33
1128.76 5.49 4.96
950.33 7.63 6.13
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
Sources: World Bank (1986b); IMF (1987), and data collected from the study countries.
Table 19. Nominal consumerprices for milk in the study countries, 1972-86.
Year Mali'
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
7(1
70
70
70
70
70
75
75
75
75
110
110
110
110
148
031
039
0.67
0.94
0.%
1.10
1.34
1.42
134
1.21
1.48
1.18
5.88
6.00
7.64
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.78
0.87
1.07
1.26
14.08
14.08
15.83
15.83
19.35
20.00
20.00
23.33
26.67
26.67
26.67
26.67
40.00
50.00
60.00
Sources: 1. Union laitiere de Bamako, Mali (personal communication).
2. Nigerian Gov't (1987), Federal Livestock Department (personal communication).
3. Animal Production Corporation, Sudan (personal communication).
4. AMA (Agricultural Marketing Authority) (1986); Dairy Marketing Board: Report and accounts
(various issues).
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Table 20. Real consumerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1972-86.
Year Mali1
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
206.06 1.80 0.63 27.45
159.45 1.97 0.55 26.62
156.21 1.98 0.43 28.07
147.52 2.08 0.44 25.49
136.53 1.74 0.44 28.08
109.20 1.64 0.37 26.32
87.82 1.65 031 24.91
91.57 1.56 0.24 2438
75.00 134 0.44 26.67
66.84 1.00 035 2336
95.82 1.14 0.28 21.30
87.23 0.74 0.38 1731
77.46 2.63 032 21.60
71.71 234 037 24.89
100.95 3.20 0.26 26.12
Note: The consumer price indices used to deflate nominal prices have 1980 as the base year, thus all prices in the
table are in terms of 1980 values.
Sources: ILO (1981; 1988); IMF (1987).
1. Union laitiere de Bamako, Mali (personal communication).
2. Nigerian Gov't (1987); Federal Livestock Department (personal communication).
3. Animal Production Corporation, Sudan (personal communication).
4. AMA (Agricultural Marketing Authority ) (1986); Dairy Marketing Board: Report and accounts
(various issues).
Table 21. Border equivalent consumerpricesfor milk in the study countries, 1972-86.
Year Mali
FCFA/kg
Nigeria
Naira/kg
Sudan
Pound/kg
Zimbabwe
Cents/kg
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
85.69 0.46 0.12 15.68
9336 033 0.14 16.21
104.79 032 0.17 18.40
9136 0.60 0.18 17.39
7935 0.40 0.15 14.09
89.70 0.42 0.17 1537
98.78 030 0.19 17.24
119.84 0.62 034 23.00
147.14 031 034 28.61
168.98 0.83 038 29.96
18531 033 0.47 32.27
200.35 0.74 035 39.66
217.90 1.70 038 43.22
22035 132 0.78 48.05
191.14 2.49 0.86 49.23
Note: Border prices have been converted at official exchange rates.
Sources: FAO (1982); FAO food outlook (various issues); World Bank (1986b), and data collected from the study
countries.
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Table 26. Nominalprotection coefficientsfor mutton consumers in the study countries, 1970-86.
Year C6te d'lvoire Mali
0.95 0.62
0.97 0.55
LOl 0.46
0.87 038
0.76 0.58
0.90 0.82
0.77 0.81
0.84 0.82
0.87 0.80
0.90 0.98
082 0.95
0.87 0.82
1.00 0.80
1.02 0.85
LOS 0.68
1.05 0.70
1.23 0.99
Nigeria Sudan
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
0.86
0.85
0.77
0.61
0.75
0.88
0.94
0.68
0.9U
0.96
0.97
0.97
1.06
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.06
0.90
0.85
0.66
0.70
0.71
1.08
0.93
1.04
0.42
1.37
1.57
1.80
1.50
1.87
1.97
1.68
2.40
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.
Table 27. Nominalprotection coefficientsfor milk consumers in the study countries, 6172-86.
Year Mali Nigeria Sudan Zimbabwe
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1985
1686
0.82
0.75
0.67
0.77
088
0.78
0.76
0.63
031
0.44
039
035
030
030
0.77
1.11
1.11
1.29
137
2.40
2.62
2.68
239
1.65
1.46
1.78
139
3.46
330
3.07
1.25
1.07
0.88
1.06
1.27
1.12
1.00
0.79
1.29
1.16
0.94
1.42
130
1.37
1.47
0.90
0.87
0.86
0.91
1.37
1.30
1.16
1.01
0.93
0.89
0.83
0.67
0.93
1.04
1.22
Note: The milk considered here is evaporated and condensed milk in the case of Nigeria, while for the rest of the
countries it is reconstituted milk.
Source: Estimated from data collected from the study countries by the author.
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THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
The International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) is one of the 18 international agricultural research
centres funded by the Consultative Group on international Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The 1 8 centres,
located mainly within the tropics, have been set up by the CGIAR over the past two decades to provide
long-term support for agricultural development in the Third World. The names, locations and research
responsibilities are as follows:
 
Centre for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR), Indonesia: forestry
research
Centra Intemacional de Agriculture
Tropical (CIAT), Colombia: cassava, field
beans, rice and tropical pastures
Centra Internacional de la Papa (OP),
Peru: potato and sweet potato
Centra Internacional de Mejoramiento
de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT), Mexico:
maize, wheat and triticale
International Center for Agricultural
Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA),
Syria: farming systems, cereals, food
legumes (faba bean, lentil, chickpea),
and forage craps
International Centre for Living Aquatic
Resources Management (ICLARM),
Philippines: aquatic resource production
International Centre for Research in
Agroforestry (ICRAF), Kenya:
agroforestry systems
International Craps Research Institute for
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), India:
chickpea, pigeon pea, pearl millet,
sorghum, groundnut, and farming
systems
International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), USA: analysis of world
food problems
International Institute of Tropical
Agriculture (IITA) , Nigeria: farming
systems, maize, rice, roots and tubers
(sweet potatoes, cassava, yams) , and
food legumes (cowpea, lima bean,
soyabean)
International Irrigation Management
Institute (IIMI), Sri Lanka: irrigated
agriculture
International Laboratory for Research on
Animal Diseases (ILRAD), Kenya:
trypanosomiasis and theileriosis of cattle
International Livestock Centre for Africa
(ILCA), Ethiopia: African livestock
production
International Network for the
Improvement of Banana and Plantain
(IN I BAP}, France: banana and plantain
International Plant Genetic Resources
Institute (IPGRI), Italy: plant genetic
resources
International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI), Philippines: rice
International Service for National
Agricultural Research (ISNAR), The
Netherlands: strengthening and
developing national agricultural research
systems
West Africa Rice Development
Association (WARDA), Cote d'rvoire: rice
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